Abstract
Many multi-agent interaction problems, like auctions and negotiations, can be modeled as games. Game theory, a formal tool for game analysis, thus can be used to analyse the strategic interactions among agents and facilitate us to design intelligent agents. Typically the agents are assumed individually rational consistent with the principle of classical game theory. However, lots of evidences suggest that fairness emotions play an important role in people’s decision-making process. To align with human behaviors, we need to take the effects of fairness motivation into account when analysing agents’ strategic interactions. In this paper, we propose a fairness model which incorporates two important aspects of fairness motivations, and the solution concept of fairness equilibrium is defined. We show that the predictions of our model successfully reflect the intuitions from both aspects of fairness motivations. Besides, some general results for identifying which outcomes are likely to be fairness equilibria are presented.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press (1994)
Simon, H.: Theories of bounded rationality. Decision and Organization 1, 161–176 (1972)
Chevaleyre, Y., Endriss, U., Lang, J., Maudet, N.: A Short Introduction to Computational Social Choice. In: van Leeuwen, J., Italiano, G.F., van der Hoek, W., Meinel, C., Sack, H., Plášil, F. (eds.) SOFSEM 2007. LNCS, vol. 4362, pp. 51–69. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Verbeeck, K., Nowé, A., Parent, J., Tuyls, K.: Exploring selfish reinforcement learning in repeated games with stochastic rewards. In: AAMAS, vol. 14, pp. 239–269 (2006)
Rabin, M.: Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American Economic Review 83, 1281–1302 (1993)
Dawes, R.M., Thaleri, R.H.: Anomalies: Cooperation. Journal of Economic Perspectives 2, 187–198 (1988)
Thaler, R.H.: Mental accounting and consumer choice. Marketing Science 4, 199–214 (1985)
Fehr, E., Schmidt, K.M.: A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 817–868 (1999)
Bolton, G., Ockenfels, A.: Erc-a theory of equity, reciprocity and competition. American Economic Review 90, 166–193 (2000)
Dufwenberg, M., Kirchsteiger, G.: A theory of sequential reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 47, 268–298 (1998)
Falka, A., Fischbache, U.: A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 54, 293–315 (2006)
de Jong, S., Tuyls, K., Verbeeck, K.: Artificial agents learning human fairness. In: AAMAS 2008, pp. 863–870. ACM Press (2008)
Hao, J.Y., Leung, H.F.: Strategy and fairness in repeated two-agent interaction. In: ICTAI 2010, pp. 3–6 (2010)
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R.H.: Fairness as a constraint on profit seeking: Entitlements in the market. American Economic Review 76, 728–741 (1986)
Camerer, C., Thaler, R.H.: Ultimatums, dictators, and manners. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 209–219 (1995)
Agell, J., Lundberg, P.: Theories of pay and unemployment: Survery evidence from swedish manufacturing firms. Scandinavian Journal of Economics XCVII, 295–308 (1995)
Bewley, T.: A depressed labor market as explained by participants. In: American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings vol. LXXXV, pp. 250–254 (1995)
Leventhal, G., Anderson, D.: Self-interest and the maintenance of equity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 15, 57–62 (1970)
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D., Stacchetti, E.: Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60–79 (1989)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Hao, J., Leung, Hf. (2012). Incorporating Fairness into Agent Interactions Modeled as Two-Player Normal-Form Games. In: Anthony, P., Ishizuka, M., Lukose, D. (eds) PRICAI 2012: Trends in Artificial Intelligence. PRICAI 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7458. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32695-0_11
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32695-0_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32694-3
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32695-0
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)