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The ‘Myth’ of Patent Justifications: Triumph and Failure Dichotomy in the North and South

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Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
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Abstract

The preceding chapter “Evolutionary Trajectories of Patents and the Politics of Exclusion in Sub-Saharan Africa” has revealed that the arguments to protect and enforce pharmaceutical patent rights are anchored on both classical and neoclassical theories for securing private proprietary interests over knowledge-based products and processes. Theories proffered in defence of the patent system include natural rights theory, reward theory, contract/disclosure of secret theory, incentive theory, prospect theory, race-to-invent theory, and the rent-dissipation theory. These theoretical assumptions have been used by scholars to justify the prevailing international patent regime and its reflections in the domestic laws of both developed and less developed countries alike. Particularly, the natural rights theory in tandem with the incentive theory played a crucial rhetorical role in the strategy of industry groups to convince governments in developed countries to demand strong patent systems across the globe. The TRIPS Agreement and its underlying theories have thus effectively secured standards of patents similar to those adopted in industrialized countries. The consequence is that the justifications for patents contribute to perpetuating the notion of the applicability of a one-size-fits-all pharmaceutical patent protection regime across countries/regions.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Although I discuss all of these theoretical justifications for patents, the bulk of the analysis in this chapter will focus on the dominant economic/property-right-inspired justifications, which have influenced the globalized patent system and its reflections in SSA.

  2. 2.

    See e.g. Oddi (1996a) at 432 [Oddi, “TRIPS – Natural Rights”].

  3. 3.

    For a discussion of some of these assumptions, see generally: Tumwine-Mukubwa (1975–1977) and Gold et al. (2004).

  4. 4.

    See Stiglitz (2008) at 1695; see also Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980) at 304.

  5. 5.

    See Rai (2009).

  6. 6.

    See Drahos and Braithwaite (2002) at 2.

  7. 7.

    Paul Martin, then Canada’s Finance Minister, in his Budget Speech on 28 February 2000, said: “Today, the strength of a nation is measured not by the weapons it wields, but by the patents it produces; not by the territory it controls, but by the ideas it advances; not only by the wealth of its resources, but by the ‘resourcefulness of its people. In such a world, successful nations will only be those that foster a culture of innovation. They will be those that create new knowledge and bring the product of that knowledge quickly to market. Our goal as a nation must be to lead the way.”, online: http://www.fin.gCca/budget00/speech/speech1e.htm#New (emphasis added).

  8. 8.

    For a detailed discussion of the alleged nexus between patents protection and industrial growth and development, see Fink and Maskus (2005); for a discussion on the need for stronger protection of IP, see the following: Rapp and Rozek (1990), Gutterman (1993), and Gould and Gruben (1996).

  9. 9.

    Haracoglou (2008) at 21.

  10. 10.

    See Kitch (1994) at 171 [the incentive to invent, commercialize and market technologies that meet the needs of less developed countries will only exist if there are patents to protect innovation]. See also, Sykes (2002) [introducing high levels of patent protection in less developed countries induces firms to invent products such as anti-malaria medicines and to engage in technology transfer].

  11. 11.

    For a detailed discussion of the failure of the Enlightenment thinking which took humanity down the barbaric path of Nazism, see Horkheimer and Adorno (1995).

  12. 12.

    Stiglitz (2002) at 282.

  13. 13.

    See e.g. Sell (2003).

  14. 14.

    Kennedy (2006).

  15. 15.

    El-Said (2005) at 55.

  16. 16.

    See El-Said (2005), ibid at 59–61.

  17. 17.

    May (2006) at 11.

  18. 18.

    See Ostergard (2003) at 3.

  19. 19.

    Adusei (2010) at 30–31.

  20. 20.

    Abbott (2005) at 78.

  21. 21.

    This phrase or its ejusdem generis finds articulation in the Memoranda to the patent laws of countries in SSA: see e.g. Ghana’s Patents Bill, 2003 (now Patents Act, 2003 – Act 657).

  22. 22.

    See section 38 of Ghana’s Patents Act, 2003 (Act 657).

  23. 23.

    Rand (1966) at 128.

  24. 24.

    Locke (1980) paragraph 27. The full text of Locke’s famous paragraph 27 of the Second Treatise reads: “Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has a right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes then he takes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.”

  25. 25.

    Smith (2003) at 103 [1776].

  26. 26.

    Morin (2009) at 80.

  27. 27.

    On this point see Mgbeoji (2006) at 19.

  28. 28.

    Oddi (1996a), supra note 2 at 432.

  29. 29.

    Oddi (1996a), ibid at 432.

  30. 30.

    Oddi (1996a), ibid at 436.

  31. 31.

    See Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  32. 32.

    See Mgbeoji (2007) at 292–293.

  33. 33.

    Locke (1980), supra note 24 at para 27.

  34. 34.

    Hettinger (1989) at 44.

  35. 35.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 18.

  36. 36.

    Piper (2008) at 65.

  37. 37.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 17.

  38. 38.

    Penrose (1973) at 22.

  39. 39.

    Cann (2004) at 784.

  40. 40.

    Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 6.

  41. 41.

    See The US Government Accountability Office (2006).

  42. 42.

    Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 27.

  43. 43.

    See Oddi (1987) at 838.

  44. 44.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 20.

  45. 45.

    Cotropia and Lemley (2009) at 1431.

  46. 46.

    Amani (2009) at 46.

  47. 47.

    Vaver (1997) at 139.

  48. 48.

    Brenner v Mason, 383 US 519 (1966) at 533.

  49. 49.

    Ostergard (2003), supra note 18 at 18.

  50. 50.

    Oddi (1987), supra note 43 at 843.

  51. 51.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 20.

  52. 52.

    See e.g. Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 33.

  53. 53.

    US Constitution, Article 1 s 8 cl 8.

  54. 54.

    See Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1 (1966).

  55. 55.

    Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 17.

  56. 56.

    See Ostergard (2007) at 129.

  57. 57.

    Merges (1988) at 805.

  58. 58.

    Article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  59. 59.

    Keayla (1998) at 259.

  60. 60.

    See Lunney (2009) at 1470; Fink and Primo Braga (2005) at 34 [to date there has been no cogent empirical evidence to establish a nexus between high patent standards and economic development).

  61. 61.

    See generally Maskus (2005); Penrose (1973), supra note 38; Machlup (1958).

  62. 62.

    On this point see Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 21, citing Sherwood (1990).

  63. 63.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 20 at 81.

  64. 64.

    Keith E Maskus, Reforming US Patent Policy: Getting the Incentives Right (CSR No. 19, November 2006) at 15.

  65. 65.

    Oddi (1996a), supra note 2 at 441.

  66. 66.

    Chandra (2010) at 193.

  67. 67.

    Chander and Sunder (2007) at 566.

  68. 68.

    Cann (2004), supra note 39 at 796.

  69. 69.

    Chander and Sunder (2007), supra note 67. See also Gutterman (1993), supra note 8 at 122.

  70. 70.

    Oddi (1987), supra note 43 at 844.

  71. 71.

    Sachs (2003) at 132.

  72. 72.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 20 at 83.

  73. 73.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 21.

  74. 74.

    Mgbeoji (2006), ibid at 25.

  75. 75.

    Gold et al. (2008), at 15.

  76. 76.

    Anderfelt (1971) at 6.

  77. 77.

    Hestermeyer (2007) at 27.

  78. 78.

    Chimni (1992) at 317.

  79. 79.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 24.

  80. 80.

    Revolutionary inventions are those inventions that produce revolutionary changes in consumption or production. They require considerable developmental investment, and have a significant risk of failure. Today, such inventions are rare, however: Oddi (1996a), supra note 2 at 442.

  81. 81.

    Oddi (1996a), ibid at 443.

  82. 82.

    Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 26.

  83. 83.

    Kitch (1977) [in propounding the prospect theory, Kitch compares the patent to the mineral claim system of the public lands of the west].

  84. 84.

    Cotropia and Lemley (2009), supra note 45 at 1432.

  85. 85.

    See Beck (1983) at 194 [Beck, “The Prospect Theory”].

  86. 86.

    Cotropia and Lemley (2009), supra note 45 at 1433.

  87. 87.

    Kitch (1977), supra note 83 at 266.

  88. 88.

    Gold (2009) at 396–397.

  89. 89.

    Cotropia and Lemley (2009), supra note 45 at 1465.

  90. 90.

    US Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub L No. 98–417, 98 Stat. 1585 [granting protection to marketing exclusivity for 5 years extends from the approval of the original drug to the approval of a generic version based on bioequivalence]; Canada Food and Drug Regulations (as amended) 2006 [granting clinical test data protection for 8 years. However, the generic companies are able to submit application for approval drug using such data after 6 years of protection]; Directive 2004/27/EC [granting protection to clinical data exclusivity for 11 years].

  91. 91.

    Beck (1983), supra note 85 at 195.

  92. 92.

    Merges and Nelson (1990) at 878.

  93. 93.

    See Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 26–27.

  94. 94.

    Merges and Nelson (1990), supra note 92 at 877.

  95. 95.

    Merges and Nelson (1990), ibid at 876.

  96. 96.

    Merges and Nelson (1990), ibid at 877, 884–908 (analyzing electrical and chemical industries, among others).

  97. 97.

    Merges and Nelson (1990), ibid at 876.

  98. 98.

    Kesan and Gallo (2009) at 1345.

  99. 99.

    Haracoglou (2008), supra note 9 at 111.

  100. 100.

    Oddi (1996b) at 283 [Oddi, “Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents”].

  101. 101.

    See Oddi (1996b), ibid at 284.

  102. 102.

    Grady and Alexander (1992) at 306.

  103. 103.

    Grady and Alexander (1992), ibid at 309.

  104. 104.

    For a synthesis of the three sources of rent dissipation under the patent system see Oddi (1996b), supra note 100 at 284; Grady and Alexander (1992), ibid at 308–309.

  105. 105.

    Oddi (1996b), ibid at 285.

  106. 106.

    Oddi (1996b), ibid.

  107. 107.

    See Mgbeoji (2006), supra note 27 at 27.

  108. 108.

    See Rawls (1999) at 508.

  109. 109.

    Arewa (2006) at 167–168.

  110. 110.

    Oddi (1996a), supra note 2 at 455.

  111. 111.

    Oddi (1996a), ibid.

  112. 112.

    Oddi (1996a), ibid at 457.

  113. 113.

    Others call it “social disorganization” or “social dysfunction” in reference to the failures or inadequacies in the functioning of a given social system. See Smith and Smith (2005).

  114. 114.

    For a description of some of the ills of the African continent, see Ayittey (1998).

  115. 115.

    See White (1986).

  116. 116.

    Harris (2006) at 724.

  117. 117.

    Ostergard (2003), supra note 18 at 3.

  118. 118.

    UNAIDS (2008).

  119. 119.

    Cann (2004), supra note 39 at 757.

  120. 120.

    See Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  121. 121.

    See Articles 3 & 4 of TRIPS.

  122. 122.

    Yu (2003) at 135.

  123. 123.

    See generally: Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 2, 12; Drahos (2005), Sell and May (2001), and Sell (2003), supra note 13 at 5.

  124. 124.

    For a discussion of terminologies such as “right”, “duty”, “ privilege”, and “power” see Corbin (1960); see also Hohfeld (2001).

  125. 125.

    Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1700.

  126. 126.

    Hestermeyer (2007), supra note 77 at 143.

  127. 127.

    Hestermeyer (2007), ibid at 143.

  128. 128.

    Edwin J Prindle quoted in Noble (1977) at 89.

  129. 129.

    Heller (2008) at 59 [Heller, The Gridlock Economy].

  130. 130.

    US, “New Drug Development, Science, Business, Regulatory, and Intellectual Property Issues cited as Hampering Drug Development Efforts”, Report of the United States Government Accountability Office, 2006.

  131. 131.

    Temin (1979) at 440 [Temin, “Technology, Regulation”].

  132. 132.

    Angell (2004) [Angell, The Truth about the Drug Companies].

  133. 133.

    Heller (2008), supra note 129 at 51.

  134. 134.

    Kitch (1994), supra note 10 at 171.

  135. 135.

    US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Electronics and Information (1987) at 230.

  136. 136.

    Outterson (2005) at 246 [Outterson, “Pharmaceutical Arbitrage”].

  137. 137.

    Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1710.

  138. 138.

    Penrose (1973), supra note 38 at 103.

  139. 139.

    Heller (2008), supra note 129 at 1–22; Amani (2009), supra note 46 at 59.

  140. 140.

    Boldrin and Levine (2008) at 208.

  141. 141.

    See: Heller (2008), supra note 129; Ostergard (2003), supra note 18; Sell (2003), supra note 13; Boldrin and Levine (2008), ibid at 69.

  142. 142.

    See Babar et al. (2007).

  143. 143.

    See Chapple v Cooper (1844)13 M & W 252. At p.258, and as far back as 1844, Alderson B provided a traditional test for determining what should qualify as ‘necessaries’ thus: “[t]hings necessary are those things without which an individual cannot reasonably exist. In the first place, food, raiment, lodging and the like. About these there is no doubt….But in all these cases, it must be out that the class itself is one in which the things furnished are essential to the existence and reasonable advantage and comfort….Thus, articles of mere luxury are always excluded, though luxurious articles of utility are in some cases allowed.” See also Nash v Inman (1908) 2 KB 1.

  144. 144.

    For the Kenyan story see Avafia et al. (2009) at 182. For the South African story, see ’t Hoen (2009) at 52–54.

  145. 145.

    Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd and Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Competition Tribunal, case no: 11/LM/Mar05, 13 October 2005.

  146. 146.

    Medicross Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd and Prime Cure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v The Competition Commission, 55/CAC/Sep05. Available at: http://www.comptriBco.za/assets/Uploads/Case-Documents/Medicross%2055CACSep05.pdf.

  147. 147.

    Drahos and Braithwaite (2002), supra note 2 at c 10 [‘Biogopolies’ – monopoly that arises from stringent intellectual property protection of biotechnological processes and products].

  148. 148.

    Temin (1979), supra note 131 at 440.

  149. 149.

    See Smith (2003), supra note 25 at 202–203.

  150. 150.

    Smith (2003), ibid at 87.

  151. 151.

    Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1699.

  152. 152.

    Smith (2003), supra note 25 at 839.

  153. 153.

    See Boyle (1996) at 179.

  154. 154.

    See Heller (2008), supra note 129 at 75.

  155. 155.

    Oguamanam (2006) at 23.

  156. 156.

    Kihwelo (2005) at 346 [Kihwelo, “Indigenous Knowledge”].

  157. 157.

    Havighurst (1960) at 402 (emphasis added).

  158. 158.

    Coombe (2001) at 285.

  159. 159.

    See Kihwelo (2005), supra note 156 at 347.

  160. 160.

    See Kihwelo (2005), ibid at 348.

  161. 161.

    See Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1716, citing Shiva and Brand (2005).

  162. 162.

    Brush and Stabinsky (1996) at 3.

  163. 163.

    Oguamanam (2006), supra note 155 at 145.

  164. 164.

    Kihwelo (2005), supra note 156 at 348.

  165. 165.

    See Shiva (1997).

  166. 166.

    Shiva (2004) at 667.

  167. 167.

    Stiglitz (2002), supra note 12 at 246.

  168. 168.

    Oguamanam (2008) at 32.

  169. 169.

    Oguamanam (2006), supra note 155 at 7.

  170. 170.

    Such a ‘defence’ was raised when India successfully challenged the grant of patent in the US to the turmeric — US Patent No. 5,401,504 (Filed December 28, 1993).

  171. 171.

    See Oguamanam (2006), supra note 155 at 41.

  172. 172.

    Oguamanam (2006), ibid.

  173. 173.

    See for e.g., Apotex Inc v Wellcome Foundation, [2002] 4 SCR 153, 2002 SCC 77.

  174. 174.

    See O’Connor and Valoir (2006).

  175. 175.

    J Michael Finger, The Doha Agenda and Development: A View from the Uruguay Round, Study for the Asian Development Bank 2002, at 13–19, 25. Finger notes that for six countries (United States, Germany, Japan, France, United Kingdom and Switzerland) the net increase in patent rents from TRIPS implementation is estimated by the World Bank at $40 billion per year. Total net payment outflows (including other forms of IP) based on full implementation are estimated at $60 billion per year, quoted in Abbott (2005), supra note 20 at 80–81.

  176. 176.

    See UNCTAD, Foreign Direct Investment and the Challenge of Development, in World Investment Report (1999). Others indicate that there are 113 researchers per million populations in SSA: Durrell and Bernier (2009) at 230–231.

  177. 177.

    Manderson (2008) [arguing that it is faith that makes people believe in the law].

  178. 178.

    On the issue of human need as the ultimate source of rights, see Woods (2003) at 764.

  179. 179.

    Glendon (1991) at 109, cited in Woods (2003), ibid.

  180. 180.

    See Outterson (2009).

  181. 181.

    Velásquez (2010) at 4.

  182. 182.

    Section 2(3) of Ghana’s Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137).

  183. 183.

    See WHO (2004).

  184. 184.

    Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss (2007).

  185. 185.

    Hestermeyer (2007), supra note 77 at 60.

  186. 186.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 20 at 85, citing Canada – Patent Protection of pharmaceutical Products WT/DS114/R (17 March 2000).

  187. 187.

    Amani (2009), supra note 46 at 262.

  188. 188.

    See generally Seelen (1997).

  189. 189.

    See Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  190. 190.

    See Para 44 of the WTO Ministerial Declaration; Article 66 of the TRIPS Agreement on transitional period for LDCs. Patent obligations on pharmaceutical products have been extended to 2016 by the TRIPS General Council.

  191. 191.

    Boldrin and Levine (2008), supra note 140 at 70.

  192. 192.

    See Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1720–1723.

  193. 193.

    Cann (2004), supra note 39 at 803. Indeed, the average annual per capita health expenditure in SSA is $6 as compared to over $2000 in OECD countries: see Oguamanam (2010) at 561, citing 2008 OECD report.

  194. 194.

    Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1720–.

  195. 195.

    See Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  196. 196.

    Gold and Lam (2003) at 30.

  197. 197.

    See Article 31(b) of the TRIPS Agreement.

  198. 198.

    Outterson (2005), supra note 136 at 225.

  199. 199.

    See Avafia et al. (2009), supra note 144 175 at 182.

  200. 200.

    See WHO (2006) at 139.

  201. 201.

    See Hoen (2009), supra note 144 at ix.

  202. 202.

    Hoen (2009), ibid at 41.

  203. 203.

    Noehrenberg (2006) at 182. It bears noting that Noehrenberg is a Director at the International Federation of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers & Associations.

  204. 204.

    Smith et al. (2009) at 686.

  205. 205.

    Kuanpoth (2007) at 204.

  206. 206.

    See Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement.

  207. 207.

    See Outterson (2005), supra note 136 at 209.

  208. 208.

    Ho (2011) at 40.

  209. 209.

    Outterson (2005), supra note 136 at 209–210.

  210. 210.

    Correa (2000) at 100–102.

  211. 211.

    See paragraph 5(d) of the Doha Declaration.

  212. 212.

    Section 92(A) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005.

  213. 213.

    Cann (2004), supra note 39 at 833.

  214. 214.

    Heller (2008), supra note 129 at 72.

  215. 215.

    This suggestion to introduce approaches in copyright administration into patents administration would require a legal framework in place to support it.

  216. 216.

    See Tol-O-Matic, Inc v Proma Produkt-Und Marketing GmbH 945 f. 2d 1546, at 1552–3 (Fed Cir, 1991).

  217. 217.

    See Carrier (2004) at 123 [Carrier, “Cabining IP through a Property Paradigm”].

  218. 218.

    For the various accounts of the anthrax story see: Hestermeyer (2007), supra note 77 at 15–17; Carrier (2004), ibid at 124–125.

  219. 219.

    Gervais (2008) at 210 [Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement].

  220. 220.

    Heller (2008), supra note 129 at 76.

  221. 221.

    See section 3(d) of the Indian Patent (Amendment) Act, 2005.

  222. 222.

    See Angell (2004), supra note 132 at 75.

  223. 223.

    Angell (2004), ibid.

  224. 224.

    Chon (2006) at 2910.

  225. 225.

    2004 SCC 34; [2004] 1 SCR 902.

  226. 226.

    Stiglitz (2008), supra note 4 at 1704. For a detailed exposition on the patenting of basmati rice, see: Chandola (2006).

  227. 227.

    See Apotex Inc v Wellcome Foundation Ltd, [2002] 4 SCR 153, 2002 SCC 77.

  228. 228.

    See Smith et al. (2009), supra note 204 at 688.

  229. 229.

    See Hoen (2009), supra note 194 at xvii; Timmermans (2005) at 70; Smith et al. (2009), ibid.

  230. 230.

    Hoen (2009), supra note 144 at 71.

  231. 231.

    See for e.g. Article 46 of the Revised Cotonou Agreement, online: http://eCeuropAeu/development/icenter/repository/second_revision_cotonou_agreement_20100311.pdf; Abbott and Reichman (2007), cited in Hoen (2009), ibid at 75–76.

  232. 232.

    See UNAIDS (2011) at 8.

  233. 233.

    See the Revised Cotonou Agreement, supra note 231; Abbott and Reichman (2007), supra note 231.

  234. 234.

    Timmermans (2005), supra note 229 at 72.

  235. 235.

    UNAIDS (2011) at 8.

  236. 236.

    See Abbott and Reichman (2007), supra note 231.

  237. 237.

    El-Said and El-Said (2007).

  238. 238.

    El-Said and El-Said (2007), ibid at 451.

  239. 239.

    Krikorian and Szymkowiak (2007) at 395.

  240. 240.

    See Morin (2006).

  241. 241.

    See HA Waxman, Statement for the Records, US Congress, House Committee on Ways and Means, Washington D.C. (10 June 2003).

  242. 242.

    Matthews and Munoz-Tellez (2006) at 638.

  243. 243.

    Boyle (2003) at 39.

  244. 244.

    See Kihwelo (2005), supra note 156 at 347.

  245. 245.

    Oddi (1996a), supra note 2 at 463.

  246. 246.

    See the Swakopmund Protocol on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge and Expressions of Folklore, 2010.

  247. 247.

    See South Africa’s Patents Amendment Act No. 20 of 2005.

  248. 248.

    See de Werra (2009).

  249. 249.

    See Mey (2010) at 453 [Mey, “Unfettered Consumer Access to Affordable Therapies”].

  250. 250.

    See Mey (2010), ibid at 453.

  251. 251.

    Mey (2010), ibid at 454.

  252. 252.

    See Venezuela’s 6 August 1999 Communication to the TRIPS Council, WT/GC/W/282.

  253. 253.

    See WT/GC/W/282.

  254. 254.

    Correa (2007) at 24.

  255. 255.

    Gopakumar and Smith (2010) at 144.

  256. 256.

    Angell (2004), supra note 132 at 75.

  257. 257.

    See Hoen (2009), supra note 144 at 78.

  258. 258.

    See Chennai Patent Office order in the application for patent no. 1602/MAS/98 (filed on 17 July 1998), online: http://www.gnaipr.com/Articles/Glivec%20Order.pdf.

  259. 259.

    Novartis AG & Another v Union of India & Others (2007) 4 MLJ 1153, online: http://www.gnaipr.com/GNACaseLaws/Judgement_GliveCpdf.

  260. 260.

    See Correa (2007), supra note 254.

  261. 261.

    Drahos (2010) at 37–38.

  262. 262.

    Drahos (2010), ibid at 295.

  263. 263.

    See Correa (2007), supra note 254.

  264. 264.

    Schovsbo (2011) 308 at 309.

  265. 265.

    Gervais (2008), supra note 219 at 211.

  266. 266.

    For a detailed narrative of this complaint, see: Hoen (2009), supra note 144 at 52–54.

  267. 267.

    See the European Commission Decision Case COMP/A37.507/F3 – AstraZeneca of 15 June 2005, OJ (2006) L 332/24.

  268. 268.

    This suggestion is taken from: Schovsbo (2011), supra note 264 at 352.

  269. 269.

    See ER Gold and J Carbone, “Myriad Genetics: In the Eye of the Policy Storm” A Report from the International Expert Group on Biotechnology, Innovation & Intellectual Property, online: The Innovation Partnership, online http://www.theinnovationpartnership.org/data/ieg/documents/cases/TIP_Myriad_LegaLpdf.

  270. 270.

    Helfer (2008) at 44.

  271. 271.

    This Ghanaian proverb is literally interpreted to mean: ‘he who is down should fear no fall’. This point should, however, not be misinterpreted as advocating for a violation of international obligations.

  272. 272.

    Abbott (2005), supra note 20 at 100.

  273. 273.

    See Merges and Kuhn (2009).

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Adusei, P. (2013). The ‘Myth’ of Patent Justifications: Triumph and Failure Dichotomy in the North and South. In: Patenting of Pharmaceuticals and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32515-1_4

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