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Shannon Impossibility, Revisited

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7412)

Abstract

In this note we revisit the famous result of Shannon [Sha49] stating that any encryption scheme with perfect security against computationally unbounded attackers must have a secret key as long as the message. This result motivated the introduction of modern encryption schemes, which are secure only against a computationally bounded attacker, and allow some small (negligible) advantage to such an attacker. It is a well known folklore that both such relaxations — limiting the power of the attacker and allowing for some small advantage — are necessary to overcome Shannon’s result. To our surprise, we could not find a clean and well documented proof of this folklore belief. (In fact, two proofs are required, each showing that only one of the two relaxations above is not sufficient.) Most proofs we saw either made some limiting assumptions (e.g., encryption is deterministic), or proved a much more complicated statement (e.g., beating Shannon’s bound implies the existence of one-way functions [IL89].)

Keywords

Mutual Information Encryption Scheme Shannon Entropy Message Space Conditional Mutual Information 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
    • 1
  1. 1.New York UniversityUSA

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