Equilibria of GSP for Range Auction

  • H. F. Ting
  • Xiangzhong Xiang
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7434)


Position auction is a well-studied model for analyzing online auctions for internet advertisement, in which a set of advertisers bid for a set of slots in a search result page to display their advertisement links. In particular, it was proved in [10,11] that the Generalized Second Price (GSP) mechanism for position auction has many interesting properties. In this paper, we extend these results to range auction, in which a bidder may specify a range of slots he is interested in. We prove GSP for range auction has an envy free equilibrium, which is bidder optimal and has the minimum pay property. Further, this equilibrium is equal to the outcome of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. We also show that the social welfare of any equilibrium of GSP for range auctions is not far from the optimal; it is at least 1/2 of the optimal.


Online Auctions Nash Equilibria Envy-free Valuations 


Algorithmic Game Theory and Online Algorithms 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • H. F. Ting
    • 1
  • Xiangzhong Xiang
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceThe University of Hong KongHong Kong

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