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Begging Questions, Their Answers and Basic Cooperativity

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNAI,volume 7258)

Abstract

We consider game-theoretic rationales for minimal cooperativity, in particular responses to questions or requests for help with false answers. Lying enables preservation of property and face for both speaker and hearer and constitutes a Pareto-optimal outcome. Rationales for this behavior include expectations of reciprocity, other-regarding, and maintenance of face.

Keywords

  • Public Good Game
  • Discourse Structure
  • Trust Game
  • Direct Answer
  • Walk Away

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Asher, N., Quinley, J. (2012). Begging Questions, Their Answers and Basic Cooperativity. In: Okumura, M., Bekki, D., Satoh, K. (eds) New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence. JSAI-isAI 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 7258. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32090-3_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32090-3_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-32089-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-32090-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)