We consider a fully observable single-server Markovian queue with variable service rate, where the customers observe the queue length and the state of the server upon arrival. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure. With considering waiting cost and reward, we study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategies for all customers.
Balking M/M/1queue Nash equilibrium strategies
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This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.11171019), Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (NCET-11-0568) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 2011JBZ012).
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