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LISS 2012 pp 619-623 | Cite as

Customers’ Equilibrium Balking Strategies in an M/M/1 Queue with Variable Service Rate

  • Le Li
  • Jinting Wang
  • Feng Zhang
Conference paper

Abstract

We consider a fully observable single-server Markovian queue with variable service rate, where the customers observe the queue length and the state of the server upon arrival. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk based on a natural reward-cost structure. With considering waiting cost and reward, we study the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategies for all customers.

Keywords

Balking M/M/1queue Nash equilibrium strategies 

Notes

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.11171019), Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University (NCET-11-0568) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 2011JBZ012).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of MathematicsBeijing Jiaotong UniversityBeijingPeople’s Republic of China

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