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LISS 2012 pp 279-286 | Cite as

Pricing and Coordination Research for TPL Based on Different Logistics Service Level

Conference paper

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a situation that different logistics service level can influence the market demand, TPL service and the pricing decision models are constructed by using game theory. The equilibrium prices, service levels under different systematic states of two TPL enterprises are given. And the conclusion of this paper shows that the strong ability of logistics service does not necessarily have a competitive advantage when under the separate decision, pricing equilibrium under joint decisions not only make both sides get more income, but is also advantageous to raise the level of service. The conclusion also shows that revenue sharing is a good coordination mechanism for logistics service union, and its revenue sharing percentage depends on the negotiation skills of both sides.

Keywords

TPL Service level Service price Revenue sharing Game theory 

Notes

Acknowledgments

This study was supported by philosophy social science fund of Hunan province (2010YBA048), general project of the ministry of education on humanities and social science research (11YJC790084) and Research fund for the Doctoral Program of higher education (20110161120032).

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.College of Economics and TradeHunan UniversityChangshaP.R. China

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