LISS 2012 pp 1025-1031 | Cite as

Price Competition Model in Centralized and Decentralized Supply Chains with Demand Disruption

  • Wenlong Chai
  • Huijun Sun
  • Wei Wang
  • Jianjun Wu
Conference paper


The paper studies the price competition of a supply chain with one supplier and tow competing retailers under occasional demand disruption. The demand disruption for two retailers occurs with different probability. The optimal prices of the supplier and two retailers in centralized or decentralized pattern are obtained under demand disruption. We find that the profits of chain partners are decreasing with the occurrence probability of the demand disruption.


Coordination Occurred probability Supply chain profit 



This work is partly supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation (8102029), Beijing Science and Technology Star Plan (2009A15), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2012JBZ005) and FANEDD (201170).


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wenlong Chai
    • 1
  • Huijun Sun
    • 1
  • Wei Wang
    • 1
  • Jianjun Wu
    • 2
  1. 1.MOE Key Laboratory for Urban Transportation Complex Systems TheoryBeijing Jiaotong UniversityBeijingPeople’s Republic of China
  2. 2.State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and SafetyBeijing Jiaotong UniversityBeijingPeople’s Republic of China

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