Price Competition Model in Centralized and Decentralized Supply Chains with Demand Disruption
The paper studies the price competition of a supply chain with one supplier and tow competing retailers under occasional demand disruption. The demand disruption for two retailers occurs with different probability. The optimal prices of the supplier and two retailers in centralized or decentralized pattern are obtained under demand disruption. We find that the profits of chain partners are decreasing with the occurrence probability of the demand disruption.
KeywordsCoordination Occurred probability Supply chain profit
This work is partly supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation (8102029), Beijing Science and Technology Star Plan (2009A15), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (2012JBZ005) and FANEDD (201170).
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