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Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Comparative Law. Models of Gathering Overseas Evidence in Criminal Matters

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Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings

Abstract

The present contribution contains a comparative analysis of this research. The comparison has been carried out combining the experiences of ten legal orders both of European and non-European countries with three international levels relating respectively to the UN, Council of Europe and EU legislation. This study focuses of two main modes of collecting overseas evidence corresponding to a wide and a narrow notion of transnational inquiries, i.e., mutual assistance and extraterritorial investigations. Within these two areas various tools of cross-border cooperation have been analyzed. Moreover, these forms of cooperation have been developed in the frame of two models, the mutual assistance and the mutual recognition model.

The analysis follows the scheme of functional comparison and aims to ascertain whether and how the selected legal orders succeed in carrying out efficient forms of transnational criminal investigations by preventing both sovereignty and human rights violations. To answer properly this question, the present research has analysed the significant developments occurred, outside and inside Europe, in all the aforementioned forms of transnational inquiries both at international and domestic level.

The chapter contributions from the three first Parts of this book are quoted with the only reference to the Author’s surname, above, and the number of the paragraph concerned. The national reports are quoted with the only reference to the Author’s surname, the indication of the report and the number of the paragraph concerned.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Sinn, Report on Germany, § 1.

  2. 2.

    On this method see Jescheck (1955), pp. 36 ff.; Reimann (2002), 679 f.; Sieber (2006), pp. 112 ff. Criticism against function comparative law has been raised by Großfeld (1984), pp. 12 ff.

  3. 3.

    In this sense Sieber (2006), pp. 80 f.

  4. 4.

    For the need for an autonomous common reference point see Jescheck (1955), p. 40; Gleß (2006), p. 45 f.

  5. 5.

    Vogler, above, § 1.

  6. 6.

    For this aim of comparative criminal law see Eser (1998), pp. 1515 ff.

  7. 7.

    In this sense Lelieur, Report on France, § 1.

  8. 8.

    Vogler, above, § 1.

  9. 9.

    Dondé Matute, Report on Mexico, § 3.

  10. 10.

    Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 1.2.

  11. 11.

    See Art. 4 ECMACM.

  12. 12.

    For a similar approach see Klip (2012), pp. 342 ff.

  13. 13.

    This model was partially adapted to particular investigative tools by the 2001 SAP ECMACM. Especially, requests for hearing witnesses and experts by videoconference can be reasoned through the impossibility and the simple non-desirableness of the person appearing in the territory of the requesting state. Furthermore, the requested state must agree with the videoconference provided it is not contrary to the fundamental principles of law of the requested country and the latter has the technical means to carry out the hearing.

  14. 14.

    Wang, Report on China, §§ 3–4.

  15. 15.

    See García Ramirez (2010).

  16. 16.

    Dondé Matute, Report on Mexico, § 2.1.

  17. 17.

    Ibid., § 2.1.

  18. 18.

    Lelieur, Report on France, § 2.1.

  19. 19.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 1.

  20. 20.

    To be sure, most of these agreements blur somewhat the obligation of the requested authority to comply with the requirements set by the requesting authority. Thus, according to Article 18(17) 2000 UN CTOC, compliance with the lex fori rule is subject both to the non-contrariety to the fundamental principles of the requested state and to the condition of possibility (“where possibile”). Similarly, pursuant to Article V(1) 1998 of the Swiss-Italian Agreement on Judicial Cooperation, the requested authority must do its best to fulfill the conditions set by the requesting authority.

  21. 21.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 4.

  22. 22.

    Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 1.2.1.

  23. 23.

    Ibid., § 1.2.2.

  24. 24.

    Ibid., § 3.1.2.

  25. 25.

    Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 3.2.

  26. 26.

    Vogler, Report on England and Wales, § 1.

  27. 27.

    Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 3.1.2.

  28. 28.

    Ibid., § 5.

  29. 29.

    Ibid., § 3.

  30. 30.

    Ibid., § 3.

  31. 31.

    Ibid., § 3.

  32. 32.

    Ibid., § 3.

  33. 33.

    Ibid., § 3.

  34. 34.

    In critical terms, with regard to Spanish case law, see Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 3.1.2.

  35. 35.

    Thaman, Report on USA, § 3.2.3.

  36. 36.

    Ibid., § 3.2.3.

  37. 37.

    Ibid., § 3.3.1.

  38. 38.

    Ibid., §§ 3.2.3 and 3.3.1.

  39. 39.

    In this sense Allegrezza (2007), p. 718 f.; Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 4.

  40. 40.

    In the same sense see Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 3.1.1.

  41. 41.

    See Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 3.1.2.

  42. 42.

    Ibid., § 3.1.3.

  43. 43.

    In the sense Gascón Inchausti, Report on Spain, § 3.1.3.

  44. 44.

    Heine/Zürcher Rentsch, Report on Switzerland, § 3.1.

  45. 45.

    Ibid., § 3.1.

  46. 46.

    Lelieur, Report on France, § 3.1.

  47. 47.

    Sinn, Report on Germany, § 3.1.

  48. 48.

    The only two EU countries that have until now implemented this Framework Decision are Scotland and Denmark.

  49. 49.

    See, among others, Spencer (2010) (2010), p. 602; Gleß (2011), pp. 597 ff.

  50. 50.

    For instance cf. Arts. 4(1) and 6(1) EUCMACM.

  51. 51.

    See respectively Art. 1(2) FD EEW and Art. 1(2) PD EIO. The text of the FD OFPE contains no reference to mutual recognition, although it is repeatedly quoted in the Consideranda.

  52. 52.

    See respectively Art. 5(1) FD OFPE, 11(1) FD EEW and Art. 8(1) PD EIO.

  53. 53.

    See respectively Art. 5(1) FD OFPE and Art. 11(1) FD EEW.

  54. 54.

    The only exception relates to the case in which measures, including search and seizure, are needed in respect of those offences for which the dual criminality requirement is not requested under Art. 14(2) [Art. 11(3)(ii)], unless the requested coercive measure is not provided for under lex loci. See Gleß (2011), p. 604.

  55. 55.

    See point 10 of the Consideranda.

  56. 56.

    Gleß (2011), p. 610.

  57. 57.

    Cf. Ruggeri, above, § 3.2.1.

  58. 58.

    Peers (2011), p. 720.

  59. 59.

    To be sure, point 12 of the Consideranda requires from the executing authority the use of the least intrusive means to obtain the documents, objects and data sought. This obligation entails the application of the subsidiarity check to the investigative means aimed at obtaining evidence, which entails an assessment typically belonging to the sphere of proportionality.

  60. 60.

    See Art. 4(1) and (6).

  61. 61.

    See Belfiore (2009), pp. 5 f.

  62. 62.

    In this sense the Proposal for a Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant of 14 November 2003, Art. 12(1)(a) and (a). COM(2003) 688 final. See Gleß 2011, p. 606.

  63. 63.

    See the European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the Proposal for a Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant of 22 March 2004, Amendment 11. P5_TA(2004)0243. See Gleß 2011, pp. 606 f.

  64. 64.

    In this sense see point 10 of the Consideranda.

  65. 65.

    Thaman, Report on USA, § 2.1.1.

  66. 66.

    In the same sense Bachmaier Winter, above, § 4.2.1.

  67. 67.

    See the Framework Decision 2009/829/JHA on the application of the mutual recognition principle to supervision measures as an alternative to provisional detention.

  68. 68.

    In this sense Bachmaier Winter (2010), p. 585.

  69. 69.

    See Gleß (2008), p. 619.

  70. 70.

    Art. 52(3) EU GRCh.

  71. 71.

    See Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  72. 72.

    See respectively Art. 7 EUCMACM and Art. 11 SAP ECMACM.

  73. 73.

    See respectively Arts. 1(1)(f) and 8 UN MTMACM and Arts. 24–25 IACMACM.

  74. 74.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  75. 75.

    See Klip (2012), p. 357.

  76. 76.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  77. 77.

    Klip (2012), p. 358.

  78. 78.

    In this sense Belfiore (2009), p. 5.

  79. 79.

    The FD EEW links the possibility for the issuing authority to participate in the execution of the activity sought to the existence of a legal source in force allowing it [Art. 9(2)]. However, there is no room in the FD EEW for a participation of the defendant or individuals from the home state.

  80. 80.

    Klip (2012), p. 358.

  81. 81.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  82. 82.

    Melillo (2009), pp. 103 f.

  83. 83.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  84. 84.

    Melillo (2009), pp. 107 ff.; Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  85. 85.

    See respectively Arts. 40(1) and 41(1) CISA.

  86. 86.

    See Klip (2012), p. 361.

  87. 87.

    See Arts. 12–14 EUCMACM.

  88. 88.

    See Arts. 17–20 SAP ECMACM.

  89. 89.

    Lelieur, Report on France, § 2.

  90. 90.

    Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 1.4.

  91. 91.

    To be sure, Italy has ratified some international agreements, such as the Swiss-Italian Agreement and the UN CTOC, providing for the setting up of joint investigation teams for specific purposes. On this topic see Scella (2012), pp. 221 ff.

  92. 92.

    See Klip (2012), p. 361.

  93. 93.

    See respectively Arts. 12(3), 14(3) EUCMACM and Arts. 18(3), 19(3) SAP ECMACM. Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 1.4.1.

  94. 94.

    See respectively Art. 13(3)(b) EUCMACM and Art. 20(3)(b) SAP ECMACM.

  95. 95.

    See Hecker (2010), pp. 227 ff.; Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 1.4.3.

  96. 96.

    In a different sense Lelieur, Report on France, § 2.

  97. 97.

    Caprioli, Report on Italy, § 6.

  98. 98.

    See respectively Art. 13(3)(b) EUCMACM and Art. 20(3)(b) SAP ECMACM.

  99. 99.

    See Art. 1(3)(b) FD JIT.

  100. 100.

    Karsai, Report on Hungary, § 1.4.1.

  101. 101.

    Ibid., § 1.4.3.

  102. 102.

    Thaman, Report on USA, §§ 3.3.1 and 4.3.1.

  103. 103.

    Ibid., § 3.2.1.

  104. 104.

    Ibid., § 3.5.

  105. 105.

    Ibid., § 3.3.2.

  106. 106.

    Ibid., § 3.2.1.

  107. 107.

    Ibid., § 3.5.

  108. 108.

    Ibid., § 3.3.2.

  109. 109.

    Ibid., § 4.4.1.

  110. 110.

    See Klip (2012), p. 361.

  111. 111.

    Thaman, Report on USA, § 3.4.2.

  112. 112.

    See respectively Art. 13(8) EUCMACM and Art. 1(8) FD JIT.

  113. 113.

    See, among others, Daniele (2008), pp. 392 ff.

  114. 114.

    In the same sense Klip (2012), p. 392.

  115. 115.

    See respectively Art. 10(5) EUCMACM and Art. 9(5) ECMACM.

  116. 116.

    See, however, the proposal exposed above in Ruggeri, § 6.

  117. 117.

    Hecker (2010), pp. 7 ff.

  118. 118.

    See, among others, Kühne (2010), p. 248.

  119. 119.

    On the shortcomings of the distinction drawn by the PD EIO in this respect see Ruggeri, above, § 5.1.2.2.

Abbreviations

AFSJ:

Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

CCP:

Code of Criminal Procedure

CISA:

Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement

ECHR:

European Convention on Human Rights

ECMACM:

European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

ECtHR:

European Court of Human Rights

EU:

European Union

EU FRCh:

Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union

EUCMACM:

Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Member States of the European Union

FD EAW:

Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant

FD EEW:

Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant

FD EEW:

Framework Decision on the European Evidence Warrant

FD JIT:

Framework Decision on Joint Investigation Teams

FD OFPE:

Framework Decision on the Execution in the EU of Orders Freezing Property or Evidence

FISA:

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act

IACHR:

Inter-American Convention of Human Rights

IACMACM:

Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

IACtHR:

Inter-American Court of Human Rights

PD EIO:

Proposal for a Directive on a European Investigation Order

SAP ECMACM:

Second Additional Protocol to European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

TEU:

Treaty on the European Union

TFEU:

Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

UN CTOC:

United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime

UN MTMACM:

United Nations Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters

USSC:

United States Supreme Court

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Ruggeri, S. (2013). Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Comparative Law. Models of Gathering Overseas Evidence in Criminal Matters. In: Ruggeri, S. (eds) Transnational Inquiries and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Criminal Proceedings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-32012-5_35

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