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Substitution-Permutation Networks, Pseudorandom Functions, and Natural Proofs

  • Eric Miles
  • Emanuele Viola
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7417)

Abstract

This paper takes a new step towards closing the troubling gap between pseudorandom functions (PRF) and their popular, bounded-input-length counterparts. This gap is both quantitative, because these counterparts are more efficient than PRF in various ways, and methodological, because these counterparts usually fit in the substitution-permutation network paradigm (SPN) which has not been used to construct PRF.

We give several candidate PRF \(\mathcal {F}_i\) that are inspired by the SPN paradigm. This paradigm involves a “substitution function” (S-box). Our main candidates are:

\(\mathcal {F}_1 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\) is an SPN whose S-box is a random function on b bits given as part of the seed. We prove unconditionally that \(\mathcal {F}_1\) resists attacks that run in time \(\le 2^{\epsilon b}\). Setting \(b = \omega (\lg n)\) we obtain an inefficient PRF, which however seems to be the first such construction using the SPN paradigm.

\(\mathcal {F}_2 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\) is an SPN where the S-box is (patched) field inversion, a common choice in practical constructions. \(\mathcal {F}_2\) is computable with Boolean circuits of size \(n \cdot \log ^{O(1)} n\), and in particular with seed length \(n \cdot \log ^{O(1)} n\). We prove that this candidate has exponential security \(2^{\Omega (n)}\) against linear and differential cryptanalysis.

\(\mathcal {F}_3 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\) is a non-standard variant on the SPN paradigm, where “states” grow in length. \(\mathcal {F}_3\) is computable with size \(n^{1+\epsilon }\), for any \(\epsilon > 0\), in the restricted circuit class \(\mathrm {TC}^0\) of unbounded fan-in majority circuits of constant-depth. We prove that \(\mathcal {F}_3\) is almost 3-wise independent.

\(\mathcal {F}_4 : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\) uses an extreme setting of the SPN parameters (one round, one S-box, no diffusion matrix). The S-box is again (patched) field inversion. We prove that this candidate fools all parity tests that look at \(\le 2^{0.9n}\) outputs.

Assuming the security of our candidates, our work also narrows the gap between the “Natural Proofs barrier” [Razborov & Rudich; JCSS ’97] and existing lower bounds, in three models: unbounded-depth circuits, \(\mathrm {TC}^0\) circuits, and Turing machines. In particular, the efficiency of the circuits computing \(\mathcal {F}_3\) is related to a result by Allender and Koucky [JACM ’10] who show that a lower bound for such circuits would imply a lower bound for \(\mathrm {TC}^0\).

Keywords

Random Function Turing Machine Block Cipher Advance Encryption Standard Seed Length 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2012 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Northeastern UniversityBostonUSA

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