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Article 28 [Council Decisions on Operational Action]

(ex-Article 14 TEU)

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The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

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Abstract

During the EPC period, joint action represented the most advanced form of collaboration between the MS in the implementation of agreed policies. Since the EPC never developed its own dedicated legal instruments, joint action was put into effect through informal decisions made collectively by the MS and as such is best described as the practical output of their intergovernmental cooperation.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    Stein (1983), p. 64; Stein (1990), p. 184. The differences between the EPC as an intergovernmental process and the EC are examined by Wessels (1982), p. 12–16.

  2. 2.

    Gröne (1993), p. 60–62; Schoutheete (1988), p. 78–80. For a discussion of the legal nature of these decisions, see Jürgens (1994), p. 128–181.

  3. 3.

    von Goll (1982); Schneider (1997).

  4. 4.

    Allen (1982); Regelsberger (1991); Coignez (1992).

  5. 5.

    On sanctions and the relationship between the EPC and the EC, see Nuttall (1987); Lak (1989); Holland (1991a); Koutrakos (2001), p. 49–66. See also Holland (1991b) and Fink-Hooijer (1994), p. 181. The policy output of the EPC more generally is analysed by Rummel (1988).

  6. 6.

    For a detailed account of the establishment of the CFSP, see Nuttall (2000). See Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992) and Corbett (1993) for the negotiating history and preparatory documents. For a general comparison of the CFSP with the EPC, see Edwards and Nuttall (1994).

  7. 7.

    This is reflected in the wording of Art. 30 SEA, which referred to the MS in their capacity as “High Contracting Parties”, rather than as MS of the EEC.

  8. 8.

    Art. J.3.1 Maastricht-TEU. See Neuwahl (1994), p. 238–239; Murphy (1998), p. 885–886.

  9. 9.

    Cremona (1994), p. 251; Denza (2002), p. 55.

  10. 10.

    See Münch (1997), p. 92–93. From late 1995 onwards, the Council has adopted joint actions in their own right as distinct legal acts, rather than as the mere subject matter of Council decisions.

  11. 11.

    Wessel (1999), p. 156. See also Denza (2002), p. 147.

  12. 12.

    Dashwood (1998), p. 1032; Murphy (1998), p. 906. See also Trybus (2005), p. 70.

  13. 13.

    An influential proposal to this effect can be found in Simplification of legislative procedures and instruments—Paper by Mr Jean-Claude Piris, 6 November 2002, WG IX—WD 06. See also Piris (2010), pp. 92–94.

  14. 14.

    For a critical assessment of these changes, see Cremona (2003), p. 1355–1358.

  15. 15.

    See de Witte (2008), p. 79–96; Sari (2012a).

  16. 16.

    Indeed, it has been suggested that joint actions could be replaced by generic Council decisions without this having any appreciable legal effects on their specific function. See Simplification of legislative procedures and instruments—Paper by Mr Jean-Claude Piris, 6 November 2002, WG IX—WD 06, p. 9–11.

  17. 17.

    See also Cloos et al. (1993), p. 478.

  18. 18.

    Council decisions on Union action are normative in a dual sense: in a narrow technical sense, serving as a regulatory framework, and in a more fundamental sense, leading to the convergence of foreign policy identities and interests. This point is reinforced by the obligations imposed on the MS under Arts 24.2 and 32 TEU.

  19. 19.

    Cf. Fink-Hooijer (1994), p. 181–182.

  20. 20.

    Schermers and Blokker (2003), p. 269 et seqq.

  21. 21.

    Dashwood (1998), p. 1033, speaks of the “predominance of the Council in the decision-making process of the CFSP”. See also Thym (2009), p. 331–333.

  22. 22.

    Art. 42.1 TEU directs the Council to undertake EU civilian and military operations using capabilities provided by the MS, while Art. 42.3 TEU in turn requires the MS to make civilian and military assets available to the Union for the implementation of the CFSP. On the question of capabilities, see Howorth (2007), p. 92–134.

  23. 23.

    This is not necessarily a recipe for swift and decisive action: see Kavanagh (1997), p. 360–364.

  24. 24.

    This provision used to form a separate paragraph of Art. J.3 TEU-Maastricht and later Art. 14 TEU-Amsterdam/Nice. Its merger with the first paragraph of Art. 28 TEU has no substantive implications.

  25. 25.

    In addition, Council decisions may include provisions calling for their automatic review, e.g. Art. 13 Joint Action 2008/550/CFSP of 23 June 2008 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and repealing Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP, O.J. L 176/20 (2008).

  26. 26.

    It should be noted that Art. 44.2 TEU imposes a separate obligation on the Council to adopt the necessary decisions in the context of EU crisis management operations.

  27. 27.

    See also Wessel (1999), p. 157. For a discussion of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus as a general principle of law, see Lauterpacht (1933), p. 272–285. For comparative perspectives, see Puelinckx (1986); Gordley (2004). Cf. Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz (ECJ 16 June 1998) para 46.

  28. 28.

    Cf. Cremer in Calliess and Ruffert (2010), Art. 28 EUV para 18.

  29. 29.

    This point is widely accepted in the literature, see Wessel (1996); p. 270; Münch (1997), p. 94; Denza (2002), p. 144–145; Koutrakos (2006), p. 400; Dashwood (2008), p. 54.

  30. 30.

    Fink-Hooijer (1994), p. 181; MacLeod et al. (1996), p. 417; Bonvicini (1998), p. 59; Nuttall (2000), p. 185.

  31. 31.

    Cf. Sohn and Yegorov (1991), p. 263; Schweisfurth (2002), p. 600.

  32. 32.

    Recital 14 Joint Action 2009/709/CFSP of 15 September 2009 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), O.J. L 246/33 (2009).

  33. 33.

    Recital 2 Joint Action 2008/749/CFSP of 19 September 2008 on the European Union military coordination action in support of UN Security Council resolution 1816 (2008) (EU NAVCO), O.J. L 252/39 (2008).

  34. 34.

    Recital 4 Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 182/46 (2004).

  35. 35.

    Recital 7 Joint Action 2009/181/CFSP of 11 March 2009 appointing the European Union Special Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, O.J. L 67/88 (2009). This practice continues following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon: e.g. Recital 5 Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP of 18 May 2010 on the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN), O.J. L 123/4 (2010).

  36. 36.

    See, for instance, Joint Action 2004/552/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on aspects of the operation of the European satellite radio-navigation system affecting the security of the European Union, O.J. L 246/30 (2004).

  37. 37.

    That the notion of “the international situation” is not synonymous with international developments is confirmed by Art. 26.1 TEU, which refers to “international developments” in the sense of specific, exceptional events that require an extraordinary meeting of the European Council to determine the strategic lines of the Union’s response to them.

  38. 38.

    See also Cremer in Calliess and Ruffert (2010), Art. 28 EUV para 4; Kaufmann-Bühler in Grabitz et al. (2010), Art. 28 EUV para 4. However, this does not indicate any change in substance: as a common foreign policy, the CFSP has always been concerned with international relations.

  39. 39.

    Eeckhout (2005), p. 402, has argued that joint actions “permit virtually any type of government activity, with the exception of general normative action creating rights and obligations for citizens”. See also Dashwood (2008), p. 54 and 64–65.

  40. 40.

    Among the considerable body of literature on this development, see Hulsroj (2002); Frowein and Kirsch (2002), p. 708–710; de Wet (2004), p. 338–368; Talmon (2005); Talmon (2009). For criticism of the exercise of general legislative powers by the Security Council, see Fremuth and Griebel (2007).

  41. 41.

    Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), (1996) 35 ILM 32 (ICTY Appeals Chamber).

  42. 42.

    Prosecutor v Duško Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction), (1996) 35 ILM 32 (ICTY Appeals Chamber) para 26–40. See Alvarez (1996); Klabbers (2009), pp. 166–168.

  43. 43.

    For example Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, O.J. L 245/17 (2004), as amended by Joint Action 2008/299/CFSP of 7 April 2008 amending Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, O.J. L 102/34 (2008). For further examples, → para 29 et seqq. On the question whether EU crisis management missions constitute subsidiary organs of the Council, see Sari and Wessel (2013).

  44. 44.

    The Council’s competence to establish subsidiary organs and agencies in the context of the CFSP is not in doubt. Such a competence may be derived from Art. 240 TFEU or it may be conceived as an implied power in so far as it is necessary for the implementation of the CFSP. On implied powers, see Schermers and Blokker (2003), p. 152; Klabbers (2009), p. 163. Concerning the principles governing the creation of such organs, see Sarooshi (1996); Torres Bernárdez (1998); Sarooshi (1999), p. 86–141.

  45. 45.

    As long as these conditions are satisfied, the decisions adopted on operational action may also serve as a legal basis for the adoption of staff regulations and similar normative regimes intended to create rights and duties for individuals. For past examples, see Staff Regulations of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, O.J. L 39/18 (2002), replaced by Staff Regulations of the European Union Institute for Security Studies, O.J. L 235/1 (2005); Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. L 39/44 (2002), most recently replaced by Council Decision 2009/747/CFSP of 14 September 2009 concerning the Staff Regulations of the European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. L 276/1 (2009).

  46. 46.

    See Simplification of legislative procedures and instruments—Paper by Mr Jean-Claude Piris, 6 November 2002, WG IX—WD 06, pp. 9–11.

  47. 47.

    See Koutrakos (2006), p. 400.

  48. 48.

    Initially, the voting procedures applicable to joint actions were set out in Art. J.3.2 TEU-Maastricht. The Treaty of Amsterdam subsequently incorporated these rules into a separate provision on voting, Art. 23 TEU-Amsterdam.

  49. 49.

    The principle gives effect the notion that the legal capacities of international organisations are limited and derive from the powers that their founding States have conferred onto them either expressly or by implication. See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996) ICJ Rep. 66, p. 78. As the ECJ held in Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention (ECJ 28 March 1996) para 23–24, the Community “has only those powers which have been conferred upon it” and must respect the principle of conferred powers in both its internal and international action. Obviously, the same applies to the EU. On the nature of the EU’s competence in this area, see Sari (2012b).

  50. 50.

    As the ICJ held with regard to the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN in Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4) (Advisory Opinion) (Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1948) ICJ Rep. 57, p. 64, “[t]he political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment”.

  51. 51.

    Since the CFSP is “subject to specific rules and procedures” (Art. 24.1 TEU), the case-law dealing with judicial review on the grounds of infringements of procedural requirements or general principles developed in the context of Community law may not be transferrable to the CFSP.

  52. 52.

    See Lauterpacht (1965), p. 89; Schermers and Blokker (2003), p. 579–580.

  53. 53.

    The ICJ made a similar distinction between the external and internal aspects of the principle of conferral in Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) ICJ Rep. 151, p. 168.

  54. 54.

    Both views find support in the literal construction of the relevant provisions, see Münch (1997), pp. 102–104, in favour of the first position and Wessel (1999), p. 132, in favour of the second. See also Schöllhorn (1996), p. 34; Burghardt and Tebbe, in von der Groeben et al. (1997), Art. J.4 para 15; Warnken (2002), p. 166; von Kielmansegg (2005), p. 258–259.

  55. 55.

    See e.g. Joint Action 96/669/CFSP of 22 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on the Great Lakes Region, O.J. L 312/1 (1996); Council Decision 96/670/CFSP of 22 November 1996 adopted on the basis of Article J.4 (2) of the Treaty on European Union on the elaboration and implementation of a Joint Action by the Union in the Great Lakes Region, O.J. L 312/3 (1996).

  56. 56.

    The fact that it also excluded qualified majority voting for decisions having military or defence implications in express terms in Art. 23.2 TEU-Amsterdam (now Art. 30.4 TEU) may suggest that this was the original purpose of Art. J.4.3 TEU-Maastricht.

  57. 57.

    For example Council Decision 2003/202/CFSP of 18 March 2003 relating to the launch of the EU military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, O.J. L 76/43 (2003); Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, O.J. L 143/50 (2003). On the use of joint actions in the area of the ESDP, see von Kielmansegg (2005), p. 258–260.

  58. 58.

    Indeed, as long as the relevant Council decisions may reasonably be said to address a question of foreign or security policy, a presumption should be deemed to exist that they are not ultra vires. See International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) ICJ Rep. 151, p. 168.

  59. 59.

    However, it is not clear whether the Council would be able to mobilise the military and civilian assets made available by the MS for the purposes of the CSDP. This may be excluded by implication under Art. 42.1 TEU, which provides that the Union may use the civilian and military assets made available to it “on missions outside the Union”. On the ambiguous scope of the mutual assistance clause found in Art. 42.7 TEU and that of the CSDP more generally, see Naert (2005), p. 192–196. See also von Kielmansegg (2007).

  60. 60.

    For example Arts 2, 3, 6 and 7 Joint Action 2007/677/CFSP of 15 October 2007 on the European Union military operation in the Republic of Chad and in the Central African Republic, O.J. L 279/21 (2007).

  61. 61.

    Subject to certain exceptions, such as the Final Provisions of the TEU of which Art. 47 TEU-Nice formed part.

  62. 62.

    Case C-91/05, Commission v Council (Small Arms) (ECJ 20 May 2008).

  63. 63.

    Case C-91/05, Commission v Council (Small Arms) (ECJ 20 May 2008) para 60–61.

  64. 64.

    Hillion and Wessel (2009), p. 578.

  65. 65.

    This strict interpretation of Art. 47 TEU-Nice has been criticised as overly rigid and unhelpful by several commentators, see Koutrakos (2008); Heliskoski (2008), p. 912; Herlin-Karnell (2008), p. 1003–1005; van Vooren (2009a, b). For a more positive assessment, see Wessel (2009).

  66. 66.

    Heliskoski (2008), pp. 910–911.

  67. 67.

    Art. 40 TEU therefore serves to safeguard the distinct features of the CFSP referred to in Art. 24.1 TEU.

  68. 68.

    Such a hierarchical relationship seems to be precluded by Art. 1.2 TFEU, which declares that the TEU and the TFEU “have the same legal value”.

  69. 69.

    See van Vooren (2009a), p. 246; Hillion and Wessel (2009), p. 583. Cf. Hinarejos (2007), p. 370, who seems to deny the possibility of an overlap in competences. This situation may be contrasted with the position before the Treaty of Lisbon, which was characterised by a separation between the objectives of the Community and the CFSP. See Dashwood (2008), p. 71–72. Cf. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05, P Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008) para 198–203.

  70. 70.

    See also Dashwood (2008), p. 77. In Small Arms, the ECJ held that the mere existence of competence under the TEC prevents the adoption of acts having legal effects under the CFSP. Transferring this reasoning to Art. 40 TEU suggests that in the case of an overlap between CFSP and non-CFSP competences and procedures, no legal acts may be adopted in either area concerned given that both are shielded from one another in identical terms. This is clearly an absurd result that would paralyze the external relations of the Union and defeat the object and purpose of the Treaties.

  71. 71.

    van Vooren (2009a), p. 247. See also Wessel (2009).

  72. 72.

    Herlin-Karnell (2008), p. 1007.

  73. 73.

    Originally, Art. J.3.1 TEU-Maastricht provided that the Council “shall lay down the specific scope, the Union’s general and specific objectives in carrying out such action, if necessary its duration, and the means, procedures and conditions for its implementation”.

  74. 74.

    Incidentally, it is worth noting that Art. 43.2 TEU in part duplicates Art. 28.1 sentence 2 TEU, for no apparent reason, when it provides that “[t]he Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 [of Art. 43 TEU], defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation”.

  75. 75.

    As the Council noted in June 1995, “[f]or the Union to be able to implement a common position or a joint action rapidly and efficiently, these texts must be drawn up with a sufficient degree of precision and detail to make them operational”, Council doc. 5194/95, Common Positions—Joint Actions—Statements, Use and Detailed Procedures for Adoption, reproduced in Council doc. 10898/08, CFSP Guide—Compilation of Relevant Texts, 18 June 2008, p. 27.

  76. 76.

    For example Art. 1 Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 24 November 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), O.J. L 307/61 (2005); Art. 1 Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 302/29 (2008).

  77. 77.

    For example Art. 3 Joint Action 2009/467/CFSP of 15 June 2009 appointing the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan and repealing Joint Action 2009/135/CFSP, O.J. L 151/41 (2009).

  78. 78.

    For example Art. 2 Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, O.J. L 300/65 (2005), most recently amended by Council Decision 2009/955/CFSP of 15 December 2009 amending Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, O.J. L 330/76 (2009).

  79. 79.

    For example the objectives of EUSEC DR, a mission dispatched by the Council to the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2005, were originally set out in Art. 2 Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), O.J. L 112/20 (2005). The Council subsequently revised these objectives on several occasions and most recently has replaced the previous instruments with Joint Action 2009/709/CFSP of 15 September 2009 on the European Union mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), O.J. L 246/33 (2009).

  80. 80.

    A comparison of the different language version of this provision suggests that they all use the term scope or its functional equivalents (e.g. rozsah, rækkevidde, Umfang, alcance, portée, raon feidhme, ulatus, hatókör, portata, draagwijdte) in a generic sense.

  81. 81.

    Art. 1 Joint Action 96/442/CFSP of 15 July 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the nomination of a Special Envoy of the European Union in the city of Mostar, O.J. L 185/2 (1996) (the provision focuses on the rationale and timescale for the phasing out of the EU administration of Mostar).

  82. 82.

    See e.g. Recital 11 and Art. 13 Joint Action 2006/319/CFSP of 27 April 2006 on the European Union military operation in support of the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) during the election process, O.J. L 116/98 (2006); Recital 11 and Art. 14 Joint Action 2008/851/CFSP of 10 November 2008 on a European Union military operation to contribute to the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast, O.J. L 301/33 (2008).

  83. 83.

    For example Art. 7 Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), O.J. L 327/28 (2005); Art. 6 Joint Action 2009/475/CFSP of 11 June 2009 on the European Union Integrated Rule of Law Mission for Iraq, EUJUST LEX, O.J. L 156/57 (2009).

  84. 84.

    However, see the annexes to Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on European Union support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), O.J. L 182/41 (2004) (sets out an indicative list of the contributions in kind to be provided to the Government of the DRC).

  85. 85.

    For example Art. 3 Joint Action 2001/801/CFSP of 19 November 2001 regarding European Union support for the establishment of an interim multinational security presence in Burundi, O.J. L 303/7 (2001); Art. 5 Joint Action 2006/419/CFSP of 12 June 2006 in support of the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 165/30 (2006).

  86. 86.

    For example Art. 7.3 Joint Action 2000/298/CFSP of 13 April 2000 on a European Union assistance programme to support the Palestinian Authority in its efforts to counter terrorist activities emanating from the territories under its control, O.J. L 97/4 (2000).

  87. 87.

    Some operations were to end on a date to be decided by the Council: e.g. Art. 16 Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on the European Union civilian-military supporting action to the African Union mission in the Darfur region of Sudan, O.J. L 188/46 (2005). Others were to be automatically reviewed: e.g. Art. 1 Joint Action 2009/854/CFSP of 20 November 2009 amending Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), O.J. L 312/73 (2009).

  88. 88.

    For example Art. 2 Joint Action 2001/568/CFSP of 26 July 2001 regarding a contribution of the European Union towards reinforcing the capacity of the Georgian authorities to support and protect the OSCE Observer Mission on the border of the Republic of Georgia with the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, O.J. L 202/2 (2001); Art. 3 Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 331/34 (2005).

  89. 89.

    For example Art. 5 Joint Action 98/117/CFSP of 2 February 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union in support of the Bosnian Peace Process, O.J. L 35/1 (1998).

  90. 90.

    Art. 7 Joint Action 2009/129/CFSP of 16 February 2009 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), O.J. L 46/40 (2009).

  91. 91.

    For example Art. 10 Council Decision 2010/279/CFSP of 18 May 2010 on the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL AFGHANISTAN), O.J. L 123/4 (2010). On the role of the PSC in the implementation of operational action, see Juncos and Reynolds (2007), pp. 135–137; Duke (2008), pp. 79–81.

  92. 92.

    For example PSC Decision EUMM/1/2008 of 16 September 2008 appointing the Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM Georgia), O.J. L 319/79 (2008); PSC Decision EUSEC/1/2010 of 18 May 2010 on the establishment of the Committee of Contributors for the European Union Mission to provide advice and assistance for security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUSEC RD Congo), O.J. L 127/14 (2010). Concerning the competence of the PSC to adopt such decisions, see von Kielmansegg 2005, pp. 277–279.

  93. 93.

    Wessel (1999), p. 91. The Council has on many occasions used mandatory language to instruct the Commission to adopt a specific course of action for the purposes of implementing joint actions, e.g. Art. 2 Joint Action 2005/913/CFSP of 12 December 2005 on support for OPCW activities in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 331/34 (2005). This practice has been criticised as an encroachment upon the Commission’s competences. See Timmermans (1996); Wessel (1999), p. 298–305.

  94. 94.

    As foreseen in Art. 18.4 TEU, which provides that the HR is “responsible within the Commission for responsibilities incumbent on it in external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the Union’s external action”.

  95. 95.

    It is useful to recall in this respect that in their report submitted to the Lisbon European Council in June 1992, the Foreign Ministers of the MS recognised that joint action necessarily had to “satisfy the objectives of the Union set out in Article B and, more particularly, in Article J.l.2” TEU-Maastricht. See Council doc. SN 3321/1/92, Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries, Annex I to Lisbon European Council Conclusions, 26 and 27 June 1992, p. 31.

  96. 96.

    Cf. Koskenniemi (1998), p. 28–29.

  97. 97.

    For a contrary view, cf. Münch (1997), p. 137–139.

  98. 98.

    As the ICJ held, “[i]nternational organizations are subjects of international law and, as such, are bound by any obligations incumbent upon them under general rules of international law, under their constitutions or under international agreements to which they are parties”, International Court of Justice, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion of 20 December 1980) ICJ Rep. 73, p. 89–90. See Amerasinghe (2005), p. 400–401; Sands and Klein (2009), p. 461–465. For a detailed list of the different sources of the Union’s international obligations, see Naert (2010), p. 452–453. For its part, the ECJ has confirmed that the “European Community must respect international law in the exercise of its powers” in Case C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp. (ECJ 24 November 1992) para 9; Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz (ECJ 16 June 1998) para 45–46; and Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission (ECJ 3 September 2008) para 291. The same obviously applies to the EU. See Tomuschat (2002); Naert (2008).

  99. 99.

    In his opinion in Kadi, AG Poiares Maduro suggested it was a mere inconvenience if “restrictions which the general principles of Community law impose on the actions of the institutions” were to prevent the MS from carrying out their international obligations; see Case C-402/05, Kadi v Council and Commission (Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro of 16 January 2008) para 39. This position has been criticised in the literature, e.g. Ličková (2008), p. 475; Ziegler (2009), p. 304; Hinojosa Martínez (2008), p. 345–346; de Wet (2009), p. 295–296. It may be contrasted with the more accommodating approach adopted in Case C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport (ECJ 3 June 2008) para 52.

  100. 100.

    See Art. 13–16 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, in Report of the International Law Commission, Sixty-third session, UN doc. A/66/10 (2011), p. 52.

  101. 101.

    Münch (1997), p. 109–114; Burghardt and Tebbe, in von der Groeben and Schwarze (1997), Art. J.3 para 7–11; Denza (2002), p. 145.

  102. 102.

    However, it appears that this never actually constrained the Council in practice. See Wessel (1999), p. 119.

  103. 103.

    For a contrary view, see Warnken (2002), p. 51.

  104. 104.

    See Fink-Hooijer (1994), p. 178, who argues that the involvement of the European Council adds political weight to the decisions of the Council.

  105. 105.

    See also Dashwood (1998), p. 1030; Murphy (1998), p. 905–906.

  106. 106.

    See Everling (1992), p. 1061; Eaton (1994), p. 217; Jürgens (1994), p. 346–347; Fink-Hooijer (1994), p. 183; McGoldrick (1997), p. 149; Münch (1997), p. 132–134; Pechstein and Koenig (2000), p. 146; Denza (2002), p. 145; Eeckhout (2005), p. 398; Koutrakos (2006), p. 401.

  107. 107.

    Klabbers (2009), p. 178, suggests that international organisations are always set up for a certain purpose and in order to attain that purpose they invariably must be able to adopt or create legal instruments. See also Sands and Klein (2009), p. 284.

  108. 108.

    See also Eeckhout (2005), p. 144; Gosalbo Bono (2006), p. 342–343. In the words of the ICJ, they are not merely hortatory, but have dispositive force and effect. See International Court of Justice, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962) ICJ Rep. 151, p. 163.

  109. 109.

    See Art. 2.1.a VCLT for the definition of “treaty”. The existence of an offer and its acceptance as the defining feature of an international agreement, a feature that is absent from Council decisions on Union action, is emphasized in the First Report by Mr. H. Lauterpacht, Special Rapporteur (1953) Yb ILC, Vol. I, p. 90, p. 101–105.

  110. 110.

    To similar effect, see Wessel (1999), p. 156 and 324.

  111. 111.

    Cf. Thirlway (2002), p. 346–347, who derives the binding effect of decisions of the UN General Assembly and the Security Council from the principle of pacta sunt servanda. There is no doubt that the TEU constitutes an international agreement subject to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. See de Witte (2010), p. 144–145. See also German Federal Constitutional Court, 2 BvE 2/08 et al. (Judgment of 30 June 2009) para 1 and 231–235—Lisbon. The ECJ has held that the pacta sunt servanda principle “constitutes a fundamental principle of any legal order and, in particular, the international legal order” in Case C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz (ECJ 16 June 1998) para 49. In addition, the Court has confirmed that the principle of good faith forms part of general international law and as such is binding upon it in Case C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v Secretary of State for Transport (ECJ 3 June 2008) para 52. See also Case C-170/96, Commission v Council (Airport Transit Visas) (ECJ 12 May 1998) para 90.

  112. 112.

    Essentially, the MS must internalise the Council’s decision.

  113. 113.

    Generally, see Ketvel (2006).

  114. 114.

    Cremona (1994), p. 256.

  115. 115.

    Cf. Denza (2004).

  116. 116.

    See Case C-170/96, Commission v Council (Airport Transit Visas) (ECJ 12 May 1998) para 16; Case C-176/03, Commission v Council (Environmental Penalties) (ECJ 13 September 2005) para 39; Case C-440/05, Commission v Council (Ship-source Pollution) (ECJ 23 October 2007) para 53.

  117. 117.

    For a more expansive position, see Case C-354/04 P, Gestoras Pro Amnistía and others v Council (Opinion of AG Mengozzi of 26 October 2006) para 77: “it must be held that, if the Union is based on the principle of the rule of law (Article 6(1) EU), its institutions and the Member States of which it is composed cannot be exempted from judicial review of the compatibility of their acts with the Treaty, in particular Article 6(2) EU, even where they act on the basis of Titles V and VI of the EU Treaty”.

  118. 118.

    Proceedings before the Strasbourg Court are more likely than proceedings before the ICJ, for instance, although they cannot be excluded in principle. See, for example, App. No. 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland (ECtHR 30 June 2005).

  119. 119.

    Cf. Wessel (1999), p. 101–104.

  120. 120.

    This inconsistency is replicated across the different language versions of Art. 28.4 TEU. For example the French version refers to “l’évolution de la situation” as opposed to “un changement de circonstances”, while the German version speaks of the “Entwicklung der Lage”, rather than “eine Änderung der Umstände”.

  121. 121.

    Significantly, the MS must only have regard to the general objectives of the relevant Council decision. This is a considerably weaker obligation than requiring them to respect the objectives and principles of the decision in question.

  122. 122.

    A parallel may be drawn here with Art. 51 UN Charter, which provides that the MS of the UN must report immediately any measures taken in the exercise of their right of self-defence to the Security Council. See Greig (1991), p. 366–388.

  123. 123.

    For example McGoldrick (1997), p. 153, note 120.

  124. 124.

    This number includes joint actions and Council decisions on Union action as well as generic Council decisions amending or repealing the former acts.

  125. 125.

    See Smith (2004). Of course, it should be borne in mind that many Council decisions on operational action are of limited duration and therefore are no longer in force.

  126. 126.

    See Wessel (1999), p. 162–169; Dashwood (2008), p. 60–65.

  127. 127.

    Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a view to identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries, Annex I to Lisbon European Council Conclusions, 26 and 27 June 1992, p. 32.

  128. 128.

    For example Joint Action 96/656/CFSP of 11 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union in support of the democratic transition process in Zaire, O.J. L 300/1 (1996); Joint Action 2004/494/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on European Union support to the establishment of the Integrated Police Unit in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), O.J. L 182/41 (2004); Joint Action 2007/805/CFSP of 6 December 2007 appointing a European Union Special Representative to the African Union, O.J. L 323/45 (2007); Joint Action 2009/128/CFSP of 16 February 2009 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative for the African Great Lakes Region, O.J. L 46/36 (2009).

  129. 129.

    For example Council Decision 94/790/CFSP of 12 December 1994 concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar, O.J. L 326/2 (1994); Joint Action 98/117/CFSP of 2 February 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union in support of the Bosnian Peace Process, O.J. L 35/1 (1998); Joint Action 2002/210/CFSP 11 March 2002 on the European Union Police Mission, O.J. L 70/1 (2002); Joint Action 2009/137/CFSP of 16 February 2009 extending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative in Kosovo, O.J. L 46/69 (2009).

  130. 130.

    For example Joint Action 2001/568/CFSP of 26 July 2001 regarding a contribution of the European Union towards reinforcing the capacity of the Georgian authorities to support and protect the OSCE Observer Mission on the border of the Republic of Georgia with the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation, O.J. L 202/2 (2001); Joint Action 2003/472/CFSP of 24 June 2003 on the continuation of the European Union cooperation programme for non-proliferation and disarmament in the Russian Federation, O.J. L 157/69 (2003); Joint Action 2004/523/CFSP of 28 June 2004 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Georgia, EUJUST THEMIS, O.J. L 228/21 (2004); Joint Action 2005/265/CFSP of 23 March 2005 appointing a Special Representative of the European Union for Moldova, O.J. L 81/50 (2005).

  131. 131.

    For example Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 193/44 (2005); Joint Action 2007/753/CFSP of 19 November 2007 on support for IAEA monitoring and verification activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 304/38 (2007); Joint Action 2008/588/CFSP of 15 July 2008 on support for activities of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in order to strengthen its monitoring and verification capabilities and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 189/28 (2008); Joint Action 2008/858/CFSP of 10 November 2008 in support of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, O.J. L 302/29 (2008).

  132. 132.

    For example Joint Action 96/588/CFSP of 1 October 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union on anti-personnel landmines, O.J. L 260/1 (1996); Joint Action 2008/113/CFSP of 12 February 2008 in support of the International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) in the framework of the EU Strategy to combat the illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition, O.J. L 40/16 (2008).

  133. 133.

    Joint Action 2000/401/CFSP of 22 June 2000 concerning the control of technical assistance related to certain military end-uses, O.J. L 159/216 (2000).

  134. 134.

    Council Decision 94/790/CFSP of 12 December 1994 concerning the joint action, adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on continued support for European Union administration of the town of Mostar, O.J. L 326/2 (1994). On this operation, see Pagani (1996); Monar (1997).

  135. 135.

    Joint Action 2000/811/CFSP of 22 December 2000 on the European Union Monitoring Mission, O.J. L 328/53 (2000).

  136. 136.

    For example Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, O.J. L 34/26 (2003); Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo, O.J. L 143/50 (2003); Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the European Union military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, O.J. L 252/10 (2004); Council Decision 2010/197/CFSP of 31 March 2010 on the launch of a European Union military mission to contribute to the training of Somali security forces (EUTM Somalia), O.J. L 87/33 (2010).

  137. 137.

    For example Joint Action 2003/681/CFSP of 29 September 2003 on the European Union Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL ‘Proxima’), O.J. L 249/66 (2003); Joint Action 2005/797/CFSP of 14 November 2005 on the European Union Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories, O.J. L 300/65 (2005); Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) (Aceh Monitoring Mission—AMM), O.J. L 234/13 (2005); Joint Action Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP of 4 February 2008 on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX KOSOVO, O.J. L 42/92 (2008).

  138. 138.

    On the EU’s crisis management operations, see Koutrakos (2006), pp. 463–470; Blockmans (2008); Naert (2010). For an up to date list of EU operations, visit http://www.consilium.europa.eu/.

  139. 139.

    In most cases the provision of financial and other assistance forms part of a broader package of measures. However, in certain cases it represents the sole purpose of the instrument in question: e.g. Joint Action 2000/717/CFSP of 16 November 2000 on the holding of a meeting of Heads of State or of Government in Zagreb (Zagreb Summit), O.J. L 290/54 (2000).

  140. 140.

    Joint Action 2002/406/CFSP of 27 May 2002 on financial support for the international negotiating process leading to the adoption of an international code of conduct against ballistic missile proliferation, O.J. L 140/1 (2002).

  141. 141.

    Joint Action 2004/796/CFSP of 22 November 2004 for the support of the physical protection of a nuclear site in the Russian Federation, O.J. L 349/57 (2004).

  142. 142.

    Joint Action 2007/501/CFSP of 16 July 2007 on cooperation with the African Centre for Study and Research on Terrorism in the framework of the implementation of the European Union counter-terrorism strategy, O.J. L 185/31 (2007).

  143. 143.

    For example Joint Action 96/676/CFSP of 25 November 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union in relation to the nomination of an EU special envoy for the Middle East peace process, O.J. L 315/1 (1996); Joint Action 1999/239/CFSP of 30 March 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union in relation to the nomination of an EU Special Envoy for Kosovo, O.J. L 89/1 (1999).

  144. 144.

    Art. 18(5) TEU-Amsterdam, now Art. 33 TEU.

  145. 145.

    For example Joint Action 2001/915/CFSP of 19 December 2001 appointing the Special Representative of the European Union to act as Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, O.J. L 337/62 (2001); Joint Action 2007/805/CFSP of 6 December 2007 appointing a European Union Special Representative to the African Union, O.J. L 323/45 (2007); Joint Action 2008/612/CFSP of 24 July 2008 concerning the appointment of the European Union Special Representative for Afghanistan, O.J. L 197/60 (2008).

  146. 146.

    On the institutional framework of the ESDP, see Trybus (2005), pp. 108–112; Duke (2008).

  147. 147.

    Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies, O.J. L 200/1 (2001); as amended by Joint Action 2006/1002/CFSP of 21 December 2006 amending Joint Action 2001/554/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Institute for Security Studies, O.J. L 409/181 (2006), corrigendum in O.J. L 36/66 (2007).

  148. 148.

    Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP of 20 July 2001 on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. (2001), most recently amended by Joint Action 2009/834/CFSP of 10 November 2009 amending Joint Action 2001/555/CFSP on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre, O.J. L 297/18 (2009).

  149. 149.

    Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP of 12 July 2004 on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, O.J. L 245/17 (2004), as amended by Joint Action 2008/299/CFSP of 7 April 2008 amending Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP on the establishment of the European Defence Agency, O.J. L 102/34 (2008). See Trybus (2006).

  150. 150.

    Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP of 18 July 2005 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC), O.J. L 194/15 (2005), replaced by Joint Action 2008/550/CFSP of 23 June 2008 establishing a European Security and Defence College (ESDC) and repealing Joint Action 2005/575/CFSP, O.J. L 176/20 (2008).

  151. 151.

    Council Decision 2001/78/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Political and Security Committee, O.J. L 27/1 (2001). See Juncos and Reynolds (2007).

  152. 152.

    Council Decision 2001/79/CFSP of 22 January 2001 setting up the Military Committee of the European Union, O.J. L 27/4 (2001).

  153. 153.

    Council Decision 2001/80/CFSP of 22 January 2001 on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, O.J. L 27/7 (2001), as most recently amended by Council Decision 2008/298/CFSP of 7 April 2008 amending Decision 2001/80/CFSP on the establishment of the Military Staff of the European Union, O.J. L 102/25 (2008).

  154. 154.

    Cf. Sari and Wessel (2013).

  155. 155.

    The case of ATHENA, the intergovernmental mechanism responsible for the financing of the common costs of EU military operations, is special in that it was established not by a joint action, but a Council decision based on Arts 13(3) and 28(3) TEU-Nice. Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications, O.J. L 63/68 (2004), as replaced by Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December 2008 establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena), O.J. L 345/96 (2008). ATHENA is not a body of the Council, but acts on behalf of the participating MS or, as the case may be, States contributing to particular EU crisis management operations. See Scannell (2004).

  156. 156.

    Art. 1.2, Council Decision 2010/427/EU of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service O.J. L 201/30 (2010).

Table of Cases

ECJ

  • ECJ 24.11.1992, C-286/90, Anklagemyndigheden v Peter Michael Poulsen and Diva Navigation Corp., ECR I-6019 [cit. in para 17]

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  • ECJ 28.03.1996, Opinion 2/94, Accession of the Community to the European Human Rights Convention, ECR I-1759 [cit. in para 12]

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  • ECJ 12.05.1998, C-170/96, Commission v Council (Airport Transit Visas), ECR I-2763 [cit. in para 20, 23]

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  • ECJ 16.06.1998, C-162/96, A. Racke GmbH & Co. v Hauptzollamt Mainz, ECR I-3655 [cit. in para 6, 17, 20]

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  • ECJ 13.09.2005, C-176/03, Commission v Council (Environmental Penalties), ECR I-7879 [cit. in para 23]

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  • ECJ 23.10.2007, C-440/05, Commission v Council (Ship-source Pollution), ECR I-9097 [cit. in para 23]

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  • ECJ 20.05.2008, C-91/05, Commission v Council (Small Arms), ECR I-3651 [cit. in para 15]

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  • ECJ 03.06.2008, C-308/06, International Association of Independent Tanker Owners (Intertanko) and Others v. Secretary of State for Transport, ECR I-4057 [cit. in para 17, 20]

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  • ECJ 03.09.2008, C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission, ECR I-6351 [cit. in para 15, 17]

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ECtHR

  • ECtHR 30.06.2005, 45036/98, Bosphorus v Ireland [cit. in para 23]

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ICJ

  • ICJ 28.05.1948, Advisory Opinion, Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), ICJ Rep. 57, p. 64 [cit. in para 12]

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  • ICJ 20.07.1962, Advisory Opinion, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), ICJ Rep. 151 [cit. in para 13, 14, 20]

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  • ICJ 20.12.1980, Advisory Opinion, Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt, ICJ Rep. 73 [cit. in para 17]

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  1. Faculty for Economics, Law and Social Science, University of Erfurt, Erfurt, Germany

    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council Institute for Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Government, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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    Hermann-Josef Blanke

  2. National Research Council - Institute fo Regionalism, Federalism and Self-Governm, Rome, Italy

    Stelio Mangiameli

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Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (2013). Article 28 [Council Decisions on Operational Action]. In: Blanke, HJ., Mangiameli, S. (eds) The Treaty on European Union (TEU). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31706-4_29

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