The Physics and Metaphysics of Computation and Cognition
Part of the
Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics
book series (SAPERE, volume 5)
For at least half a century, it has been popular to compare brains and minds to computers and programs. Despite the continuing appeal of the computational model of the mind, however, it can be difficult to articulate precisely what the view commits one to. Indeed, critics such as John Searle and Hilary Putnam have argued that anything, even a rock, can be viewed as instantiating any computation we please, and this means that the claim that the mind is a computer is not merely false, but it is also deeply confused.
KeywordsComputational State Actual World Causal Structure Effective State Effective Degree
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
Bokulich, P.: Hempel’s dilemma and domains of physics. Analysis 71, 646–651 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bokulich, P.: Causal reduction and the explanatory power of physical dynamics (2012) (unpublished manuscript)Google Scholar
Chalmers, D.J.: Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton? Synthese 108, 310–333 (1996)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chalmers, D.J.: The character of consciousness. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, H.: Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge (1988)Google Scholar
Scheutz, M.: Computational vs. causal complexity. Minds And Machines 11(4), 543–566 (2001)zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
Searle, J.R.: The rediscovery of mind. MIT Press, Cambridge (1992)Google Scholar
© Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2013