Introducing Experion as a Primal Cognitive Unit of Neural Processing
The aim of this manuscript is to introduce the notion of experion. This notion is proposed as the primal cognitive unit of neural processing. The proposal focuses on the fact that neural systems have evolved to characterize and act in the situation in which they are involved according to the needs and state of the system, primed by past experience and biased by neurobiological predispositions. The proposal goes on to acknowledge a cluster of principles that characterize neural functioning by its cognitive openness, contingent specialization and selection, as well as cross-modality and heterarchical processing. The proposed framework assumes these facts and hypothesizes that the basic unit is a neural event that holistically integrates all neural processes that take part in addressing the adaptive topic at issue. In particular, I have defined an experion as a neural controlled event within which a particular neuroenvironmental configuration of contents are created to deal with the individual’s adaptive topic at issue. The specific nature of such contents and its ability to address the topic at issue are a product of the deployment of the relevant associations with previous registers of such couplings channeled through the basic operations of the neural architecture. The evolutionary bottom line is that the neural system should not be seen as a system that represents reality, but a system that adapts to it, adjusting the agent to the environment in the best way to obtain its objectives: experiencing, and learning from it.
KeywordsNeural System Neural Circuit Basic Operation Neural Processing Extended Mind
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