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Artificial Intelligence and the Body: Dreyfus, Bickhard, and the Future of AI

  • Daniel Susser
Part of the Studies in Applied Philosophy, Epistemology and Rational Ethics book series (SAPERE, volume 5)

Abstract

For those who find Dreyfus’s critique of AI compelling, the prospects for producing true artificial human intelligence are bleak. An important question thus becomes, what are the prospects for producing artificial non-human intelligence? Applying Dreyfus’s work to this question is difficult, however, because his work is so thoroughly human-centered. Granting Dreyfus that the body is fundamental to intelligence, how are we to conceive of non-human bodies? In this paper, I argue that bringing Dreyfus’s work into conversation with the work of Mark Bickhard offers a way of answering this question, and I try to suggest what doing so means for AI research.

Keywords

Skillful Coping Human Intelligence Downward Causation Intelligent Creature Artificial Intelli 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag GmbH Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Philosophy DepartmentStony Brook UniversityStony BrookUSA

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