Avoiding Man-in-the-Middle Attacks When Verifying Public Terminals

  • Gergely Alpár
  • Jaap-Henk Hoepman
Part of the IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology book series (IFIPAICT, volume 375)


An individual who intends to engage in sensitive transactions using a public terminal such as an ATM needs to trust that (a) all communications are indeed carried out with the intended terminal, (b) such communications are confidential, and (c) the terminal’s integrity is guaranteed. Satisfying such requirements prevents man-in-the-middle attacks and eavesdropping.

We have analysed several existing transaction schemes and concluded that they tend not to meet all requirements during the entire transaction. We propose a new, generic protocol that provides (a) optional terminal identification, (b) key establishment, and (c) customisable integrity assurance.


Mobile Phone Secure Channel Trust Platform Module Personal Device Malicious Software 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. 1.
    Bangerter, E., Djackov, M., Sadeghi, A.-R.: A Demonstrative Ad Hoc Attestation System. In: Wu, T.-C., Lei, C.-L., Rijmen, V., Lee, D.-T. (eds.) ISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5222, pp. 17–30. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Brands, S., Chaum, D.: Distance Bounding Protocols. In: Helleseth, T. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1993. LNCS, vol. 765, pp. 344–359. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory T-22, 644–654 (1976)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Francis, L., Hancke, G., Mayes, K., Markantonakis, K.: Practical nfc peer-to-peer relay attack using mobile phones. IACR Eprint archive (April 2010)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Garriss, S., Cáceres, R., Berger, S., Sailer, R., van Doorn, L., Zhang, X.: Trustworthy and personalized computing on public kiosks. In: Proceeding of the 6th International Conference on Mobile Systems, Applications, and Services, MobiSys 2008, pp. 199–210. ACM, New York (2008)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  6. 6.
    Kim, C.H., Avoine, G., Koeune, F., Standaert, F.-X., Pereira, O.: The Swiss-Knife RFID Distance Bounding Protocol. In: Lee, P.J., Cheon, J.H. (eds.) ICISC 2008. LNCS, vol. 5461, pp. 98–115. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. 7.
    McCune, J.M., Perrig, A., Reiter, M.K.: Seeing-is-believing: using camera phones for human-verifiable authentication. International Journal of Security and Networks 4(1-2), 43–56 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Oprea, A., Balfanz, D., Durfee, G., Smetters, D.K.: Securing a remote terminal application with a mobile trusted device. In: ACSAC, pp. 438–447 (2004)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Parno, B.: Bootstrapping trust in a “trusted” platform. In: Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Hot Topics in Security, pp. 9:1–9:6. USENIX Association, Berkeley (2008)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Pearson, S. (ed.): Trusted computing platforms: TCPA technology in context. HP Professional Series. Prentice Hall PTR (2003)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Smart, N.P.: Cryptography, An Introduction, 3rd edn. (2011),
  12. 12.
    Stumpf, F., Tafreschi, O., Röder, P., Eckert, C.: A robust integrity reporting protocol for remote attestation. In: Second Workshop on Advances in Trusted Computing (WATC 2006 Fall), Tokyo, Japan, pp. 25–36 (November 2006)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Toegl, R., Hutter, M.: An approach to introducing locality in remote attestation using near field communications. J. Supercomput. 55, 207–227 (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© IFIP International Federation for Information Processing 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gergely Alpár
    • 1
    • 2
  • Jaap-Henk Hoepman
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.TNOThe Netherlands
  2. 2.ICIS Digital SecurityRadboud UniversityNijmegenThe Netherlands

Personalised recommendations