Communication Logic on Multi-Modal Logic S5n

Conference paper
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 179)

Abstract

This article investigates a communication logic based on the multi-modal logic S5n, and it is treated from multi-modal logical point of view. We introduce models for the logic as knowledge revision processes on agents’ knowledge by communication through messages, and the completeness theorem is shown: the communication logic is determined by the class of all the models.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Knowledge Structure Canonical Model Strategic Game Finite Model 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

The research was supported by Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (C) (No. 23540178) in the Japan Society for the Promotion of Sciences and it was also supported by the BUSAIKU-BUHI Foundation for Scientific Researches.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Natural SciencesIbaraki National College of TechnologyHitachinaka-shiJapan

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