Shareholder Activism in Canada: The Emergence of a New Tool for Improving Corporate Governance Practices

  • Vanessa Serret
  • Sylvie Berthelot


Shareholder democracy is gaining ground the world over. This chapter analyses the emergence of shareholder activism in Canada as a tool for improving corporate governance practices and explains the reasons underlying the recent apparition of activism in this country. In addition, it describes the nature of proposals according to filer type and targeted firms, which in turn provides a complete overview of shareholder democracy since its early beginnings and from 2000 to 2009. Finally, a review of activism in other countries offers some elements of comparison.


Corporate Social Responsibility Institutional Investor Hedge Fund Minority Shareholder Executive Compensation 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.University of Southern BrittanyVannesFrance
  2. 2.University of SherbrookeSherbrookeCanada

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