What Are Friends for? CEO Networks, Pay and Corporate Governance

  • Rayna Brown
  • Ning Gao
  • Edward Lee
  • Konstantinos Stathopoulos


We investigate the impact of CEO networking on compensation arrangements. Unlike existing studies that are largely based on board interlocks, we use a unique measure that calculates the direct ties the CEO has created during her life. We show that a CEO’s compensation is significantly affected by her power in the managerial labour market. We find that the size of the CEO network is positively related to the level of CEO compensation and inversely related to its pay-performance sensitivity. We interpret our results as direct evidence that managerial power influences compensation. However, in firms where shareholders rights are well protected, the impact of the CEO network over pay arrangements diminishes. This implies that outrage cost and governance reduces managerial power in pay negotiation. Overall, our results are consistent with the predictions of the managerial power approach.


Corporate Governance Chief Executive Officer Managerial Power Board Size Board Independence 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rayna Brown
    • 1
  • Ning Gao
    • 2
  • Edward Lee
    • 2
  • Konstantinos Stathopoulos
    • 2
  1. 1.University of MelbourneMelbourneAustralia
  2. 2.University of ManchesterManchesterUK

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