SEPastry: Security Enhanced Pastry

  • Madhumita Mishra
  • Somanath Tripathy
  • Sathya Peri
Part of the Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing book series (AISC, volume 176)


Pastry is one of the most popular DHT overlay used in various distributed applications, because of its scalability, efficiency and reliability. On the other hand, Pastry is not resistant against the more generous attacks include Sybil attack, Eclipse attack etc. In this paper, we propose SEPastry (security enhanced pastry) to heighten the security features of Pastry without using any computational cryptographic primitives. SEPastry is found to be resistant against various forms of node-id attacks like Sybil attack, Eclipse attack, etc.


Structured p2p Pastry Security node-id attack 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Madhumita Mishra
    • 1
  • Somanath Tripathy
    • 1
  • Sathya Peri
    • 1
  1. 1.Indian Institute of Technology PatnaPatnaIndia

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