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How to Fix Two RSA-Based PVSS Schemes—Exploration and Solution

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNSC,volume 7372)

Abstract

At ACISP 2011, Peng shows that efficiency of two RSA-based PVSS schemes deteriorates to an intolerable level when practical parameter setting is adopted. In this paper, we show that Peng’s newest PVSS scheme cannot solve the problem. A new PVSS scheme is designed in this paper to fix the problem in the two RSA-based PVSS schemes. It demonstrates that secure and practical PVSS can be designed on the base of RSA encryption.

Keywords

  • Secret Sharing
  • Fair Exchange
  • Direct Anonymous Attestation
  • Basic Proof
  • Multiplicative Modulus

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Peng, K., Henricksen, M. (2012). How to Fix Two RSA-Based PVSS Schemes—Exploration and Solution. In: Susilo, W., Mu, Y., Seberry, J. (eds) Information Security and Privacy. ACISP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7372. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31447-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31448-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)