Security Protocols, Constraint Systems, and Group Theories

  • Stéphanie Delaune
  • Steve Kremer
  • Daniel Pasaila
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7364)


When formally analyzing security protocols it is often important to express properties in terms of an adversary’s inability to distinguish two protocols. It has been shown that this problem amounts to deciding the equivalence of two constraint systems, i.e., whether they have the same set of solutions. In this paper we study this equivalence problem when cryptographic primitives are modeled using a group equational theory, a special case of monoidal equational theories. The results strongly rely on the isomorphism between group theories and rings. This allows us to reduce the problem under study to the problem of solving systems of equations over rings. We provide several new decidability and complexity results, notably for equational theories which have applications in security protocols, such as exclusive or and Abelian groups which may additionally admit a unary, homomorphic symbol.


Abelian Group Group Theory Function Symbol Equational Theory Security Protocol 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Stéphanie Delaune
    • 1
  • Steve Kremer
    • 2
  • Daniel Pasaila
    • 1
    • 3
  1. 1.LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan & INRIA Saclay Île-de-FranceFrance
  2. 2.LORIA, INRIA Nancy Grand EstFrance
  3. 3.Google, Inc.France

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