GHB#: A Provably Secure HB-Like Lightweight Authentication Protocol

  • Panagiotis Rizomiliotis
  • Stefanos Gritzalis
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7341)


RFID technology constitutes a fundamental part of what is known as the Internet of Things; i.e. accessible and interconnected machines and everyday objects that form a dynamic and complex environment. In order to secure RFID tags in a cost-efficient manner, the last few years several lightweight cryptography-based tag management protocols have been proposed. One of the most promising proposals is the \(\textit{HB}^{+}\) protocol, a lightweight authentication protocol that is supported by an elegant security proof against all passive and a subclass of active attackers based on the hardness of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem. However, the \(\textit{HB}^{+}\) was shown to be weak against active man-in-the-middle (MIM) attacks and for that several variants have been proposed. Yet, the vast majority of them has been broken.

In this paper, we introduce a new variant of the \(\textit{HB}^+\) protocol that can provably resist MIM attacks. More precisely, we improve the security of another recently proposed variant, the \(\textit{HB}^\#\) protocol by taking advantage of the properties of the well studied Gold power functions. The new authentication protocol is called \(\textit{GHB}^\#\) and its security can be reduced to the LPN problem. Finally, we show that the \(\textit{GHB}^\#\) remains practical and lightweight.


Boolean Function Authentication Protocol Message Authentication Code Almost Perfect Nonlinear Cryptology ePrint Archive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Panagiotis Rizomiliotis
    • 1
  • Stefanos Gritzalis
    • 1
  1. 1.Dep. of Information and Communication Systems EngineeringUniversity of the Aegean, KarlovassiSamosGreece

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