Advertisement

Scheduler-Independent Declassification

  • Alexander Lux
  • Heiko Mantel
  • Matthias Perner
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7342)

Abstract

The controlled declassification of secrets has received much attention in research on information-flow security, though mostly for sequential programming languages. In this article, we aim at guaranteeing the security of concurrent programs. We propose the novel security property WHAT&WHERE that allows one to limit what information may be declassified where in a program. We show that our property provides adequate security guarantees independent of the scheduling algorithm (which is non-trivial due to the refinement paradox) and present a security type system that reliably enforces the property. In a second scheduler-independence result, we show that an earlier proposed security condition is adequate for the same range of schedulers. These are the first scheduler-independence results in the presence of declassification.

Keywords

Security Property Memory State Security Condition Label Transition System Program Point 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Almeida Matos, A., Boudol, G.: On Declassification and the Non-Disclosure Policy. Journal of Computer Security 17(5), 549–597 (2009)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Askarov, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Gradual Release: Unifying Declassification, Encryption and Key Release Policies. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 207–221 (2007)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Askarov, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Localized Delimited Release: Combining the What and Where Dimensions of Information Release. In: Workshop on Programming Languages and Analysis for Security, pp. 53–60 (2007)Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Askarov, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Tight Enforcement of Information-Release Policies for Dynamic Languages. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 43–59 (2009)Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Banerjee, A., Naumann, D.A., Rosenberg, S.: Expressive Declassification Policies and Modular Static Enforcement. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 339–353 (2008)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Barthe, G., Cavadini, S., Rezk, T.: Tractable Enforcement of Declassification Policies. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, pp. 83–97 (2008)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Barthe, G., Rezk, T., Russo, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Security of Multithreaded Programs by Compilation. In: Biskup, J., López, J. (eds.) ESORICS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4734, pp. 2–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Bell, D.E., LaPadula, L.: Secure Computer Systems: Unified Exposition and Multics Interpretation. Tech. Rep. MTR-2997, MITRE (1976)Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Bossi, A., Piazza, C., Rossi, S.: Compositional Information Flow Security for Concurrent Programs. Journal of Computer Security 15(3), 373–416 (2007)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Broberg, N., Sands, D.: Flow Locks: Towards a Core Calculus for Dynamic Flow Policies. In: Sestoft, P. (ed.) ESOP 2006. LNCS, vol. 3924, pp. 180–196. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Broberg, N., Sands, D.: Paralocks: Role-based Information Flow Control and Beyond. In: ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pp. 431–444 (2010)Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Goguen, J.A., Meseguer, J.: Security Policies and Security Models. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 11–20 (1982)Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Huisman, M., Worah, P., Sunesen, K.: A Temporal Logic Characterisation of Observational Determinism. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 3–15 (2006)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Jacob, J.: On the Derivation of Secure Components. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 242–247 (1989)Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Li, P., Zdancewic, S.: Downgrading Policies and Relaxed Noninterference. In: ACM Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pp. 158–170 (2005)Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Lux, A., Mantel, H.: Declassification with Explicit Reference Points. In: Backes, M., Ning, P. (eds.) ESORICS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5789, pp. 69–85. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Lux, A., Mantel, H.: Who Can Declassify? In: Degano, P., Guttman, J., Martinelli, F. (eds.) FAST 2008. LNCS, vol. 5491, pp. 35–49. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Mantel, H.: Preserving Information Flow Properties under Refinement. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 78–91 (2001)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Mantel, H.: Information Flow and Noninterference. In: van Tilborg, H.C.A., Jajodia, S. (eds.) Encyclopedia of Cryptography and Security, 2nd edn., pp. 605–607. Springer (2011)Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Mantel, H., Reinhard, A.: Controlling the What and Where of Declassification in Language-Based Security. In: De Nicola, R. (ed.) ESOP 2007. LNCS, vol. 4421, pp. 141–156. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  21. 21.
    Mantel, H., Sands, D.: Controlled Declassification based on Intransitive Noninterference. In: Chin, W.-N. (ed.) APLAS 2004. LNCS, vol. 3302, pp. 129–145. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Mantel, H., Sudbrock, H.: Flexible Scheduler-Independent Security. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 116–133. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. 23.
    McCullough, D.: Specifications for Multi-Level Security and a Hook-Up Property. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 161–166 (1987)Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Morgan, C.: The Shadow Knows: Refinement of Ignorance in Sequential Programs. In: Yu, H.-J. (ed.) MPC 2006. LNCS, vol. 4014, pp. 359–378. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. 25.
    Myers, A.C., Liskov, B.: Protecting Privacy using the Decentralized Label Model. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology 9(4), 410–442 (2000)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. 26.
    Myers, A.C., Sabelfeld, A., Zdancewic, S.: Enforcing Robust Declassification and Qualified Robustness. Journal of Computer Security 14, 157–196 (2006)Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Roscoe, A.W., Woodcock, J.C.P., Wulf, L.: Non-interference through Determinism. In: Gollmann, D. (ed.) ESORICS 1994. LNCS, vol. 875, pp. 33–53. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    Russo, A., Sabelfeld, A.: Securing Interaction between Threads and the Scheduler in the Presence of Synchronization. Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming 78(7), 593–618 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  29. 29.
    Sabelfeld, A., Myers, A.C.: A Model for Delimited Information Release. In: Futatsugi, K., Mizoguchi, F., Yonezaki, N. (eds.) ISSS 2003. LNCS, vol. 3233, pp. 174–191. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. 30.
    Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: A Per Model of Secure Information Flow in Sequential Programs. In: Swierstra, S.D. (ed.) ESOP 1999. LNCS, vol. 1576, pp. 40–59. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. 31.
    Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: Probabilistic Noninterference for Multi-threaded Programs. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 200–215 (2000)Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: Dimensions and Principles of Declassification. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 255–269 (2005)Google Scholar
  33. 33.
    Sabelfeld, A., Sands, D.: Declassification: Dimensions and Principles. Journal of Computer Security 17(5), 517–548 (2009)Google Scholar
  34. 34.
    Sutherland, D.: A Model of Information. In: National Computer Security Conference (1986)Google Scholar
  35. 35.
    Volpano, D., Smith, G.: Probabilistic Noninterference in a Concurrent Language. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 34–43 (1998)Google Scholar
  36. 36.
    Zdancewic, S., Myers, A.C.: Observational Determinism for Concurrent Program Security. In: IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop, pp. 29–43 (2003)Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alexander Lux
    • 1
  • Heiko Mantel
    • 1
  • Matthias Perner
    • 1
  1. 1.Computer ScienceTU DarmstadtGermany

Personalised recommendations