Towards Tool Support for Design and Safety Analysis of High Consequence Arming Systems Using Matlab

  • Dan Slipper
  • Wilson Ifill
  • Gordon Hunter
  • Roger Green
  • Richard Johnson
  • Alistair A. McEwan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing book series (LNBIP, volume 113)


High consequence arming systems are designed to prevent unwanted external (or potentially internal) energy flowing to a critical component without intention. The hazard analysis of such systems can be a slow and difficult manual process, potentially repeated in various life-cycle phases or on multiple design options. This paper details a simulation tool under development at AWE to provide a fast and repeatable analysis process. The simulation generates a set of possible paths along which different energy types could potentially propagate through the system. Behaviour identified by the tool can support the design of the system and selection of an architecture providing assurance of safety whilst still providing reliability. We present an outline of the model development process, results from its use with a case study and demonstrate the advantages over manual analysis. A number of limitations of the current implementation are discussed, we then propose future work aimed at alleviating some of these issues.


safety analysis matlab simulation propagation 


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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Dan Slipper
    • 1
  • Wilson Ifill
    • 2
  • Gordon Hunter
    • 2
  • Roger Green
    • 2
  • Richard Johnson
    • 2
  • Alistair A. McEwan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EngineeringUniversity of LeicesterUK
  2. 2.AWE, AldermastonUK

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