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Abstract

Consider a game played by two mountaineers climbing a mountain.Both are only interested in attaining the summit and can only reach it with help from the other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?

Keywords

Preferential Attachment Download Time Upload Bandwidth Telecommunication Engineer Discrete Period 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mike Ruberry
    • 1
  • Sven Seuken
    • 1
  1. 1.Harvard UniversityCambridgeUSA

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