Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational
Consider a game played by two mountaineers climbing a mountain.Both are only interested in attaining the summit and can only reach it with help from the other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?
KeywordsPreferential Attachment Download Time Upload Bandwidth Telecommunication Engineer Discrete Period
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