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Natural Signs

  • Ruth Garrett Millikan
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7318)

Abstract

A description of natural signs and natural information is proposed that interprets the presence of natural information as an affordance for the particular animal or species that would interpret it. This solves the reference class problem that undercuts earlier correlational accounts. It explains how there can be natural signs of individuals and also various non-correlational signs. The effect of superimposition of natural signs is then described.

Keywords

Measle Virus Reference Class Natural Sign Repeated Pattern Connected Locale 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ruth Garrett Millikan
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUnited States of America

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