Information and Logical Discrimination

  • Patrick Allo
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7318)


Allo & Mares [2] present an “informational” account of logical consequence that is based on the content-nonexpansion platitude. The core of this proposal is an inversion of the standard direction of explanation: Informational content is not defined relative to a pre-existing logical space, but it is approached in terms of the level of abstraction at which information is assessed.

In this paper I focus directly on one of the main ideas introduced in that paper, namely the contrast between logical discrimination and deductive strength, and use this contrast to (1) illustrate a number of open problems for an informational conception of logical consequence, (2) review its connection with the dynamic turn in logic, and (3) situate it relative to the research agenda of the philosophy of information.


Logical Consequence Classical Logic Logical System Intuitionist Logic Logical Space 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    Aberdein, A., Read, S.: The philosophy of alternative logics. In: Haaparanta, L. (ed.) The Development of Modern Logic, pp. 613–723. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. 2.
    Allo, P., Mares, E.: Informational semantics as a third alternative? Erkenntnis, 1–19 (2011),
  3. 3.
    Anderson, A.R., Belnap, N.D.: Entailment. The Logic of Relevance and Necessity, vol. I. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1975)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Barwise, J.: Information and impossibilities. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38(4), 488–515 (1997)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Barwise, J., Perry, J.: Situation and Attitudes. The David Hume Series of Philosophy and Cognitive Science Reissues. CSLI Publications, Stanford (1999)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Beall, J.C., Restall, G.: Logical Pluralism. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Beall, J., Brady, R., Dunn, J., Hazen, A., Mares, E., Meyer, R., Priest, G., Restall, G., Ripley, D., Slaney, J., Sylvan, R.: On the ternary relation and conditionality. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1–18 (May 2011) online FirstGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    van Benthem, J.: Logical dynamics meets logical pluralism? Australasian Journal of Logic 6, 182–209 (2008)MathSciNetzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    van Benthem, J.: The information in intuitionistic logic. Synthese 167(2), 251–270 (2009)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  10. 10.
    Copeland, B.J.: On when a semantics is not a semantics: Some reasons for disliking the Routley-Meyer semantics for relevance logic. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8(1), 399–413 (1979), MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. 11.
    Floridi, L.: The Philosophy of Information. Oxford University Press, Oxford (2011)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Gentzen, G.: Untersuchungen über das logische Schließen. I. Mathematische Zeitschrift 39(1), 176–210 (1935)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Haack, S.: Deviant Logic. Some Philosophical Issues. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1974)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    Humberstone, I.L.: Logical discrimination. In: Béziau, J.Y. (ed.) Logica Universalis, pp. 207–228. Birkhäuser Verlag, Basel (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Mares, E.: Relevant logic and the theory of information. Synthese 109(3), 345–360 (1997)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  16. 16.
    Mares, E.: General information in relevant logic. Synthese 167(2), 343–362 (2009)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. 17.
    Paoli, F.: Substructural logics a primer. Trends in Logic: Studia Logica Library, vol. 13. Kluwer Academic, Dordrecht (2002)zbMATHGoogle Scholar
  18. 18.
    Restall, G.: Information flow and relevant logics. In: Seligman, J., Westerståhl, D. (eds.) Logic, Language and Computation: The 1994 Moraga Proceedings, pp. 463–477. CSLI-Press, Stanford (1994)Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    Saguillo, J.M.: Methodological practice and complementary concepts of logical consequence: Tarski’s model-theoretic consequence and Corcoran’s information-theoretic consequence. History and Philosophy of Logic 30(1), 21–48 (2009)MathSciNetCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. 20.
    Tarski, A.: On the concept of logical consequence. In: Tarski, A., Corcoran, J. (eds.) Logic, Semantics, Meta-Matematics, 2nd edn., Hackett, Indianapolis (1983)Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Wansing, H.: The Logic of Information Structures. LNCS (LNAI), vol. 681. Springer, Berlin (1993)zbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  22. 22.
    Wansing, H.: Informational interpretation of substructural logics. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2, 285–308 (1993)MathSciNetzbMATHCrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Patrick Allo
    • 1
  1. 1.Centre for Logic and Philosophy of ScienceVrije Universiteit BrusselBrusselsBelgium

Personalised recommendations