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Noninterference via Symbolic Execution

  • Conference paper

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNPSE,volume 7273)


Noninterference is a high-level security property that guarantees the absence of illicit information flow at runtime. Noninterference can be enforced statically using information flow type systems; however, these are criticized for being overly conservative and rejecting secure programs. More precision can be achieved by using program logics, but such an approach lacks its own verification tools. In this work we propose a novel, alternative approach: utilizing symbolic execution in combination with ideas from program logics in an attempt to increase the precision of analyses and automate noninterference testing. Dealing with policies incorporating declassification is also explored. The feasibility of the proposal is illustrated using a prototype tool based on the KLEE symbolic execution engine.


  • Noninterference
  • declassification
  • symbolic execution
  • testing

This research is partly funded by the EU project FP7-231620 HATS: Highly Adaptable and Trustworthy Software using Formal Models ( ).


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Milushev, D., Beck, W., Clarke, D. (2012). Noninterference via Symbolic Execution. In: Giese, H., Rosu, G. (eds) Formal Techniques for Distributed Systems. FMOODS FORTE 2012 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7273. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg.

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  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30792-8

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