Abstract
In this paper, we investigate a cooperative spectrum sharing mechanism realized by a dynamic Bayesian spectrum bargaining between a pair of non-myopic primary user and secondary user. The primary user has only incomplete information of the secondary user’s energy cost. We model such a bargaining process as a dynamic Bayesian game, and discuss the equilibria under all possible system parameters. Furthermore, we discuss in details the sequential equilibrium where the reputation effect plays an important role. Our analysis shows that the secondary user with a low energy cost can exploit the primary user’s lack of complete information for its own benefits.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Yan, Y., Huang, J., Zhao, M., Wang, J. (2012). Dynamic Bayesian Spectrum Bargaining with Non-myopic Users. In: Ren, P., Zhang, C., Liu, X., Liu, P., Ci, S. (eds) Wireless Internet. WICON 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 98. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30493-4_18
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30492-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30493-4
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