“To Sense” or “Not to Sense” in Energy-Efficient Power Control Games

  • Maël Le Treust
  • Yezekael Hayel
  • Samson Lasaulce
  • Mérouane Debbah
Conference paper
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 75)


A network of cognitive transmitters is considered. Each transmitter has to decide his power control policy in order to maximize energy-efficiency of his transmission. For this, a transmitter has two actions to take. He has to decide whether to sense the power levels of the others or not (which corresponds to a finite sensing game), and to choose his transmit power level for each block (which corresponds to a compact power control game). The sensing game is shown to be a weighted potential game and its set of correlated equilibria is studied. Interestingly, it is shown that the general hybrid game where each transmitter can jointly choose the hybrid pair of actions (to sense or not to sense, transmit power level) leads to an outcome which is worse than the one obtained by playing the sensing game first, and then playing the power control game. This is an interesting Braess-type paradox to be aware of for energy-efficient power control in cognitive networks.


Nash Equilibrium Power Control Congestion Game Matrix Game Stage Game 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Maël Le Treust
    • 1
  • Yezekael Hayel
    • 2
  • Samson Lasaulce
    • 1
  • Mérouane Debbah
    • 3
  1. 1.Laboratoire des signaux et systèmes(CNRS - SUPELEC - Paris 11)Gif-sur-YvetteFrance
  2. 2.Laboratoire d’information d’AvignonUniversité d’AvignonAvignonFrance
  3. 3.Chaire AlcatelSUPELECGif-sur-YvetteFrance

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