Advertisement

The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks

  • Hongda Xiao
  • Edmund M. Yeh
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 75)

Abstract

This work considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. We consider the practical situation where a node cannot observe the state of links adjacent to other nodes. We examine a general game setting where the source has full bargaining power, and propose a framework for analyzing the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Relay Node Incomplete Information Transfer Payment Link Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. 1.
    Roughgarden, T., Tardos, E.: How bad is selfish routing? In: Proceedings of the 41st Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2000)Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    He, L., Walrand, J.: Pricing and revenue sharing strategies for internet service providers. In: Proceedings of the 24th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, vol. 1, pp. 205–216 (2005)Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Shakkottai, S., Srikant, R.: Economics of network pricing with multiple isps. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking 14(6), 1233–1245 (2006)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. 4.
    Acemoglu, D., Ozdaglar, A.: Competition and efficiency in congested markets. Math. Oper. Res. 32(1), 1–31 (2007)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  5. 5.
    Neely, M.: Optimal pricing in a free market wireless network. In: IEEE 26th IEEE International Conference on Computer Communications, INFOCOM 2007, pp. 213–221 (May 2007)Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Zhong, S., Chen, J., Yang, Y.: Sprite: a simple, cheat-proof, credit-based system for mobile ad-hoc networks. In: Proceedings of IEEE INFOCOM, vol. 3, pp. 1987–1997 (March 2003)Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Ileri, O., Mau, S.-C., Mandayam, N.: Pricing for enabling forwarding in self-configuring ad hoc networks. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 23(1), 151–162 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. 8.
    Wang, B., Han, Z., Liu, K.R.: Distributed relay selection and power control for multiuser cooperative communication networks using stackelberg game. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing 8(7), 975–990 (2009)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. 9.
    Xi, Y., Yeh, E.: Pricing, competition, and routing for selfish and strategic nodes in multi-hop relay networks. In: Proceedings of the 27th Annual Joint Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, pp. 1463–1471 (2008)Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Bertsekas, D.P., Gallager, R.: Data Networks, 2nd edn. Prentice Hall (1992)Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract). In: Proceedings of the Thirty-First Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 1999, pp. 129–140. ACM, New York (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. 12.
    Archer, A., Papadimitriou, C., Talwar, K.: An approximate truthful mechanism for combinatorial auctions with single parameter agents. Internet Mathematics 1(2), 129–150 (2006)MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar
  13. 13.
    Dobson, I., Carreras, B., Lynch, V., Newman, D.: Communication requirements of vcg-like mechanisms in convex environments. In: Proceedings of the Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (2005)Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Gairing, M., Monien, B., Tiemann, K.: Selfish routing with incomplete information. Theory of Computing Systems 42, 91–130 (2008), doi:10.1007/s00224-007-9015-8MathSciNetCrossRefzbMATHGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hongda Xiao
    • 1
  • Edmund M. Yeh
    • 1
  1. 1.Electrical EngineeringYale UniversityUSA

Personalised recommendations