The Impact of Incomplete Information on Games in Parallel Relay Networks
This work considers the impact of incomplete information on incentives for node cooperation in parallel relay networks with one source node and multiple relay nodes. All nodes are selfish and strategic, interested in maximizing their own profit instead of the social welfare. We consider the practical situation where a node cannot observe the state of links adjacent to other nodes. We examine a general game setting where the source has full bargaining power, and propose a framework for analyzing the efficiency loss induced by incomplete information.
KeywordsNash Equilibrium Relay Node Incomplete Information Transfer Payment Link Cost
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