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Spatio-temporal Control for Dynamic Routing Games

  • Manjesh Kumar Hanawal
  • Eitan Altman
  • Rachid El-Azouzi
  • Balakrishna J. Prabhu
Part of the Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering book series (LNICST, volume 75)

Abstract

In this paper, we study dynamic routing games where the decision of an user is spatio-temporal control. Each user ships its demand over time on a shared resource. We investigate the equilibrium of such systems and show the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. In the second part, we study a stochastic congestion games where there is only one shared resource and the traffic is indivisible. The information structure that we consider is such that each user knows the state of its own buffer but not aware of states and the actions taken by other users. The game can be described as a game with random environment. We characterize the structure of equilibria policies using linear programming. We also study the properties of equilibrium considering another model for stochastic congestion game in which a fixed amount of divisible demand arrives each day. This demand can shipped to destination by sending some part today and remaining the next day.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Stochastic Game Congestion Game Potential Game Delay Cost 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Manjesh Kumar Hanawal
    • 1
    • 2
  • Eitan Altman
    • 1
  • Rachid El-Azouzi
    • 2
  • Balakrishna J. Prabhu
    • 3
    • 4
  1. 1.Maestro group, INRIASophia AntipolisFrance
  2. 2.LIA, University of AvignonAvignonFrance
  3. 3.CNRS; LAASToulouseFrance
  4. 4.Université de Toulouse; UPS, INSA, INP, ISAE; LAASToulouseFrance

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