Soziale Dilemmata

  • Peter Fischer
  • Kathrin Asal
  • Joachim I. Krueger
Part of the Springer-Lehrbuch book series (SLB)


Stellen Sie sich vor, Sie müssten für eines Ihrer Seminare bei einer Gruppenarbeit mitwirken. Der Arbeitsauftrag widerstrebt Ihnen, da Sie sehr im Stress sind und nicht wissen, wie Sie das zeitlich noch schaffen könnten. Ihr vorrangiges Interesse besteht darin, möglichst wenig Zeit in die Arbeit zu investieren.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Weiterführende Literatur

  1. Binmore, K. G. (2007). Game theory: A very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  2. Komorita, S. S. & Parks, C. D. (1996). Social dilemmas. Boulder: Westview Press.Google Scholar
  3. Poundstone, W. (1993). Prisoner’s dilemma. New York: Doubleday.Google Scholar
  4. Shultz, C. J. & Holbrook, M. B. (1999). Marketing and the tragedy of the commons: A synthesis, commentary, and analysis for action. Journal of Public Policy & Marketing, 18, 218–229.Google Scholar


  1. Acevedo, M. & Krueger, J. I. (2004). Two egocentric sources of the decision to vote: The voter’s illusion and the belief in personal relevance. Political Psychology, 25, 115–134.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  2. Aldrich, J. H. (1993). Rational choice and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 37, 246–278.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. Andreoni, J. (1988). Why free ride? Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291–304.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Baron, J. (2000). Thinking and deciding (3rd edition). New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  5. Bernoulli, D. (1738/1896).Versuch einer neuen Theorie der Wertbestimmung on Glücksfällen. Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.Google Scholar
  6. Dawes R. M. (1980). Social dilemmas. Annual Reviews of Psychology, 31, 169–193.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  7. Dawes, R. M., McTavish, J. & Shaklee, H. (1977). Behavior, communication, and assumptions about other people’s behavior in a commons dilemma situation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 35, 1–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  8. Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
  9. Diamond, J. (2005). Collapse: How societies choose to fail or succeed. New York: Viking.Google Scholar
  10. Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteer’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, 605–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Eisenberg, N. & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation between empathy and prosocial and related behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101, 91–119.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  12. Epley, N., Caruso, E. M. & Bazerman, M. H. (2006). When perspective taking increases taking: Reactive egoism in social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91, 872–889.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. Falk, A. & Fischbacher, U. (2006). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior, 54, 293–315.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. Fehr, E. & Gächter, S. (2002). Altruistic puishment in humans. Nature, 415, 137–140.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. Flood, M. & Drescher, M. (1952). Some experimental games. Research memorandum RM–789. Santa Monica: Rand.Google Scholar
  16. Guyer, M. J. & Rapoport, A. (1966). A taxonomy of 2 x 2 games. General Systems, 11, 203–214.Google Scholar
  17. Hardin, G. (1968). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 243–248.Google Scholar
  18. Hobbes, T. (1651/1963). Leviathan (mit einer Einführung von J. Plamenatz). Cleveland: World Pub.Google Scholar
  19. Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, K. & Smith, V. (1994). Preferences, property rights and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 346–380.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  20. Kant, I. (1785/2004). Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (hrsg., eingel. und erl. von Jens Timmermann). Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.Google Scholar
  21. Kelley, H. H. & Thibaut, J. W. (1978). Interpersonal relations: A theory of interdependence. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
  22. Krueger, J. I., DiDonato, T. E. & Freestone, D. (2012). Social projection can solve social dilemmas. Psychological Inquiry, 23, 1–27.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Krueger, J. I. & Massey, A. L. (2009). A rational reconstruction of misbehavior. Social Cognition, 27, 785–810.Google Scholar
  24. Krueger, J. I., Massey, A. L. & DiDonato, T. E. (2008). A matter of trust: From social preferences to the strategic adherence of social norms. Negotiation & Conflict Management Research, 1, 31–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  25. Ledyard, J. O. & Palfrey, T. R. (1995). Experimental game theory introduction. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 1–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  26. Luce, R. D. & Raiffa, H. (1957). Games and decisions. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
  27. Malthus, T. R. (1798). An essay on the principle of population, as it affects the future improvement of society. London: Johnson.Google Scholar
  28. Nowak, M. & Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the prisoner’s dilemma game. Nature, 364, 56–58.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  29. Nummenmmaa, L., Hyönä, J. & Hietanen, J. K. (2009). I’ll walk this way. Psychological Science, 20, 1454–1458.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  30. Orbell, J. M., Van de Kragt, A. J. & Dawes, R. M. (1988). Explaining discussion-induced cooperation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 811–819.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Orbell, J. M. & Dawes, R. M. (1993). Social welfare, cooperators’ advantage, and the option of not playing the game. American Sociological Review, 58, 787–800.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  32. Organ, D. W. (1988). Organizational citizenship behavior: The good soldier syndrome. Lexington: Lexington Books.Google Scholar
  33. Pilkey, O. J. & Pilkey-Jarvis, L. (2007). Useless arithmetic: Why environmental scientists can’t predict the future. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
  34. Pillutla, M. & Chen, X. P. (1999). Social norms and cooperation in social dilemmas. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 78, 81–103.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  35. Pruitt, D. G. & Kimmel, M. J. (1977). Twenty years of experimental gaming: Critique, sythesis, and suggestions for the future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363–392.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  36. Rousseau, J.-J. (1755/1992). Discourse on the origins of inequality. Indianapolis: Hackett.Google Scholar
  37. Russell, B. A. W. (1959). Common sense and nuclear warfare. George Allen and Unwin: London.Google Scholar
  38. Sally, D. (1995). Conversation and cooperation in social dilemmas. Rationality and Society, 7, 58–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  39. Shariff, A. F. & Noranzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you: Priming god concepts increases prosocial behavior in an anonymous economic game. Psychological Science, 18, 803–809.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  40. Smith, A. (1759/1976). The theory of moral sentiments (hrsg. D. D. Raphael & A. L. Macfie). Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  41. Smith, M. J. (1982). Evolution and the theory of games. New York: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  42. Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46, 35–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  43. Utz, S. (2004). Self-activation is a two-edged sword: The effects of I primes on cooperation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 769–776.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  44. Van Lange, P. A. M. (1999). The pursuit of joint outcomes and equality in outcomes: An integrative model of social value orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 337–349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  45. Von Neumann, J. & Morgenstern, O. (1947). Theory of games and economic behavior. Princeton. Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
  46. Vohs, K. D. & Schooler, J. W. (2008). The value of believing in free will: Encouraging a belief in determinism increases cheating. Psychological Science, 19, 49–54.PubMedCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  47. Wu, J. & Axelrod, R. (1995). How to cope with noise in the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 39, 183–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  48. Zhong, C, -B., Loewenstein, J. & Murnighan, J. (2007). Speaking the same language: The cooperative effects of labeling in the prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 431–456.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Peter Fischer
    • 1
  • Kathrin Asal
    • 1
  • Joachim I. Krueger
    • 2
  1. 1.Universität RegensburgRegensburg
  2. 2.Brown UniversityBrown

Personalised recommendations