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Conditional Information Flow Policies and Unwinding Relations

  • Chenyi Zhang
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7173)

Abstract

Noninterference provides a control over information flow in systems for ensuring confidentiality and integrity security properties. In general, user A is not allowed to interfere with user B if A’s behaviour cannot cause any difference in B’s observation. Unwinding relations are useful verification techniques for noninterference-based properties. This paper defines a framework for the notion of conditional noninterference, which allows to specify information flow policies based on the semantics of action channels. To verify the properties, we present unwinding relations that are both sound and complete for the new policies.

Keywords

Policy Language Security Policy Security Requirement Security Property Local Respect 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Chenyi Zhang
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer Science and EngineeringThe University of New South WalesAustralia

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