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International Conference on Research in Networking

NETWORKING 2012: NETWORKING 2012 Workshops pp 121–125Cite as

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In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic Analysis

In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic Analysis

  • Eitan Altman17 
  • Conference paper
  • 766 Accesses

  • 2 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCCN,volume 7291)

Abstract

Content providers (CPs) may be faced with the question of how to choose in what content to specialize. We consider several CPs that are faced with a similar problem and study the impact of their decisions on each other using a game theoretic approach. As the number of content providers in a group specializing in a particular content increases, the revenue per content provider in the group decreases. The function that relates the number of CPs in a group to the revenue of each member may vary from one content to another. We show that the problem of selecting the content type is equivalent to a congestion game. This implies that (i) an equilibrium exists within pure policies, (ii) the game has a potential so that any local optimum of the potential function is an equilibrium of the original problem. The game is thus reduced to an optimization problem. (iii) Sequences of optimal responses of players converge to within finitely many steps to an equilibrium. We finally extend this problem to that of user specific costs in which case a potential need not exist any more. Using results from crowding games, we provide conditions for which sequences of best responses still converge to a pure equilibrium within finitely many steps.

Keywords

  • Content Provider
  • Internet Service Provider
  • Content Type
  • Congestion Game
  • Elastic Case

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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References

  1. Jiménez, T., Hayel, Y., Altman, E.: Competition in Access to Content. In: Bestak, R., Domenech, J. (eds.) NETWORKING 2012, Part II. LNCS, vol. 7290, pp. 211–222. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)

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  2. Milchtaich, I.: Congestion Games with Player-Specic Payoff Functions. Games and Economic Behavior 13, 111–124 (1996)

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  3. Rosenthal, R.: A Class of Games Possessing Pure-Strategy Nash Equilibria. International Journal of Game Theory 2, 65–67 (1973)

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  4. Monderer, D., Shapley, L.S.: Potential games. Games and Econ. Behavior 14, 124–143 (1996)

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. INRIA, Sophia-Antipolis, 2004 Route des Lucioles, 06902, Sophia Antipolis, France

    Eitan Altman

Authors
  1. Eitan Altman
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Telecommunications Engineering, Czech Technical University in Prague, Technicka 2, 166 27, Prague 6, Czech Republic

    Zdenek Becvar, Robert Bestak & Lukas Kencl,  & 

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© 2012 IFIP International Federation for Information Processing

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Cite this paper

Altman, E. (2012). In Which Content to Specialize? A Game Theoretic Analysis. In: Becvar, Z., Bestak, R., Kencl, L. (eds) NETWORKING 2012 Workshops. NETWORKING 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7291. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30039-4_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30039-4_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30038-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30039-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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