Consistent Conjectures in Mixed Oligopoly with Discontinuous Demand Function

  • Nataliya I. Kalashnykova
  • Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov
  • Mario A. Ovando Montantes
Part of the Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies book series (SIST, volume 15)


In this paper, a conjectured variations equilibrium state (CVE) in a mixed oligopoly model is studied. The agents make conjectures concerning the variations of the clearing price in a dependence upon variations in their production volumes. Existence and uniqueness theorems are established for the conjectured variations equilibrium (called an exterior equilibrium) for any set of feasible conjectures. To introduce the notion of an interior equilibrium, the authors develop a consistency criterion for the conjectures (referred to as influence coefficients). Next, an existence theorem for the interior equilibrium (understood as a CVE with consistent conjectures) is proved.


Demand Function Interior Equilibrium Active Demand Cournot Competition Social Surplus 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nataliya I. Kalashnykova
    • 1
    • 2
  • Vyacheslav V. Kalashnikov
    • 2
    • 3
    • 4
  • Mario A. Ovando Montantes
    • 3
  1. 1.Graduate School of Mathematical SciencsFCFM, UANLSan Nicolás de los GarzaMexico
  2. 2.Sumy State UniversitySumyUkraine
  3. 3.ITESMMonterreyMexico
  4. 4.Central Economics and Mathematics Institute (CEMI)Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS)MoscowRussia

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