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Using Incentives to Obtain Truthful Information

  • Boi Faltings
Part of the Communications in Computer and Information Science book series (CCIS, volume 271)

Abstract

There are many scenarios where we would like agents to report their observations or expertise in a truthful way. Game-theoretic principles can be used to provide incentives to do so. I survey several approaches to eliciting truthful information, in particular scoring rules, peer prediction methods and opinion polls, and discuss possible applications.

Keywords

Nash Equilibrium Good Service Opinion Poll Expected Reward Ulterior Motive 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • Boi Faltings
    • 1
  1. 1.Artificial Intelligence Laboratory (LIA)Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL), IN-EcublensEcublensSwitzerland

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