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Insider Attacks and Privacy of RFID Protocols

  • Ton van Deursen
  • Saša Radomirović
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7163)

Abstract

We discuss insider attacks on RFID protocols with a focus on RFID tag privacy and demonstrate such attacks on published RFID protocols. In particular, we show attacks on a challenge-response protocol with IND-CCA1 encryption and on the randomized hashed GPS protocol.

We then show that IND-CCA2 encryption can be used to prevent insider attacks and present a protocol secure against insider attacks. The protocol is based solely on elliptic-curve operations.

Keywords

Hash Function Elliptic Curve Encryption Scheme Inside Attack Protocol Execution 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ton van Deursen
    • 1
  • Saša Radomirović
    • 1
  1. 1.University of LuxembourgLuxembourg

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