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Taking Stock of Military Reform in Indonesia

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Book cover The Politics of Military Reform

Part of the book series: Global Power Shift ((GLOBAL))

Abstract

Can we assert that military reform in Indonesia has come to a standstill? Since the downfall of Suharto in 1998, Indonesian military is by no means in a weak position. The military may no longer be the leading actor in national politics, but has pragmatically incorporated a strategy enabling it to play a “behind the scenes” role (Sebastian, 2007). Having abolished the “dual-function” doctrine that legitimated military engagement in socio-political affairs, the armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) leadership has placed more emphasis on transforming its institutional profile and improving its human rights record. Civilian politicians have compromised the process of reform. Far from depoliticizing the military, President Abdurrahman Wahid sought to marshal military support against the Indonesian parliament (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) moving to impeach him due to his involvement in high profile corruption cases. In early 2001, he proposed to TNI high-command that a state of emergency be declared to enable him to dissolve the DPR. The proposal, however, was rejected by a military leadership aware that any overt political involvement on their part would be counterproductive to their efforts to restore the TNI’s public image. Meanwhile, during Megawati’s presidency, the counterinsurgency operation in Aceh had given new impetus for TNI to take on a greater role in internal security in the guise of “military operations other than war” thereby signalling the end of attempts by post-Suharto military reformers to limit their function purely to external defense.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    See also R. Liddle “Indonesia’s Army Remains a Closed Corporate Group,” The Jakarta Post, 3 June 2003.

  2. 2.

    Public opinion surveys in several media revealed the military’s loss of public trust. See “Surveys reveals ABRI’s Poor Public Image,” The Jakarta Post, 29 September 1998; “Jajak Pendapat Kompas tentang Citra ABRI: Sebagian Masyarakat Ingin Dwifungsi Ditanggalkan,” Kompas, 4 October 1998.

  3. 3.

    In the wake of the New Order, army officers were sharply divided into two major factions struggling for control of the military establishment and its patronage network. The mainstream nationalist-oriented officers were widely known as the “red-and-white” faction. These officers were close allies of General Wiranto (the Armed Forces’ Commander-in-Chief), who in that time had a problematic relationship with Suharto’s son-in-law Lieutenant General Prabowo Subianto (the Commander of Army Strategic Command) who maintained close links to the so-called “green” Islamic officers. For military factionalism during this period, see for example Crouch (2010, p. 131); Hafidz (2006, pp. 62–109); Honna (2003, pp. 159–164); Mietzner (2009, pp. 109–138).

  4. 4.

    These officers had stints as Wiranto’s aide-de-camp during the political upheavals leading to Suharto’s resignation. Among them were generals Agus Widjojo, Agus Wirahadikusumah and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono.

  5. 5.

    See Indonesian Armed Forces Headquarters (1998).

  6. 6.

    TNI Headquarters (2001), pp. 10, 11.

  7. 7.

    See Navy Chief of Staff Decree No. 07/II/2001 on Navy’s “Eka Sasana Jaya” Doctrine; Air Force Chief of Staff Decree No. 24/X/2000 on Air Force’s “Swa Bhuana Paksa” Doctrine; Army Chief of Staff Decree No. 01/XII/2000 on Army’s “Kartika Eka Paksi” Doctrine.

  8. 8.

    See TNI Commander Decree No. 21/I/2007 on TNI Doctrine “Tri Dharma Eka Karma.”

  9. 9.

    See Ministry of Defense. (2007). Doktrin Pertahanan Negara. Jakarta, p. 71.

  10. 10.

    See Ministry of Defense. (2007). Strategi Pertahanan Negara. Jakarta, p. 52.

  11. 11.

    Article 6 and 7 of Act No. 34/2002 on the Indonesia National Defense Force.

  12. 12.

    Article 11 Verse 1 and 2, ibid.

  13. 13.

    Article 76 Verse 1, ibid.

  14. 14.

    See “Perpres Bisnis TNI Tanpa Tenggat,” Kompas, 15 October 2009.

  15. 15.

    See Minister of Defense Decree No. 2/M/II/2002 on The Implementation of Humanitarian Law and Human Right Principles in National Defense.

  16. 16.

    This term is popularized by Kimberly Zisk. See Zisk (1993, p. 21).

  17. 17.

    “TNI Lakukan Efisiensi,” Kompas, 24 September 2010; “Admiral Agus Suhartono: We Must First Secure the Key Points,” Tempo, 19 October 2010.

  18. 18.

    As of November 2010, Indonesian government had dispatched 1,785 soldiers and policemen placing it at rank seventeenth of all troops-contributing countries.

  19. 19.

    The monthly rates of reimbursement for individual peacekeeping troops are: US$1,028 for allowances; US$68 for personal clothing, gear and equipment; US$5 for personal weapon; and US$303 supplementary pay for specialist.

  20. 20.

    In 2006, the Department of Defense justified the acquisition plan of France made-Armoured Vanguard Vehicles (VAB) for TNI’s peacekeeping operation in Lebanon. See “Panser Perancis Jadi Dibeli,” Republika, 11 October 2006.

  21. 21.

    Article 13 and 14 of Law No. 3/2002 on State Defense; Article 17 and 18 of Law No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  22. 22.

    Article 7, section 2 point b of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  23. 23.

    Article 18, sections 1 and 2 of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  24. 24.

    Article 19 of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  25. 25.

    Article 3, section 1 and 2 of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  26. 26.

    Article 16 of Act No. 3/2002, op.cit.

  27. 27.

    Articles 14, 17 and 24 of Act No. 3/2002, op.cit; Articles 13, 17, 18 and 67 of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  28. 28.

    Article 65 of Act No. 34/2004, op.cit.

  29. 29.

    Article 74 of Act 34/2004, op.cit.

  30. 30.

    For example, in 2003, a commercial airliner spotted two U.S. F-18 s along with a carrier battle-group flying over near Bawean Island, East Java province. An Indonesian senior naval officer similarly reported that between January to September 2010, Malaysian warships had intruded several times into Indonesian territory particularly near Ambalat waters, in the vicinity of East Kalimantan province. See “Kapal Malaysia Kerap Langgar Batas Wilayah,” Media Indonesia, 13 October 2010.

  31. 31.

    See, for example, Ministry of Defense (2004), pp. 12–17.

  32. 32.

    J. Sudarsono “Real Military Reforms Depends on Civilians,” The Jakarta Post, 23 June 2004.

  33. 33.

    See “Pemerintah Fokuskan Dalam Negeri,” Kompas, 10 May 2010.

  34. 34.

    See “Kredit Rp. 2,785 Triliun untuk Operasional Dephan,” Kompas, 19 November 2009.

  35. 35.

    See Minister of Defense Decree No. 01/M/I/2005 on The Procedure of Military Procurement with Export Credit Funding within the Ministry of Defense and TNI Headquarters.

  36. 36.

    See “KE Alutsista Rusia Terkendala Kredit Ekspor,” Republika, 7 February 2006.

  37. 37.

    To clarify further, these reports were the result of a random audit on selected, but not all, bureaus within the Ministry of Defense, Army Headquarters, Navy Headquarters and Air Force Headquarters structure.

  38. 38.

    See State Audit Agency (2009, p. 46, 2010, p. 45).

  39. 39.

    According to Article 56 of Presidential Decree No. 42/2002, both functional and procurement expenditures within the Ministry of Defense and TNI Headquarters was disbursed through the State Treasury Office (KPKN). The article though stipulates that the regulation was to be “implemented gradually” without mentioning definite timeline. See Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 42/2002 on the Guideline for the Implementation of Annual National Budget.

  40. 40.

    See Minister of Defense Decree No. 1698/M/X/2002 on the Structure of Program and Budget in State Defense.

  41. 41.

    See “Siasat Mencegah Besi Tua,” Tempo, 28 June 2009.

  42. 42.

    See International Institute of Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011, London: Routledge 2011, p. 242.

  43. 43.

    See E. Laksmana “Defense and Leaders Transformation,” The Jakarta Post, 12 May.

  44. 44.

    See “Presiden: Saatnya Anggaran Pertahanan Naik Signifikan,” Kompas, 5 May 2010.

  45. 45.

    “Streamlining Purchase,” Tempo, 30 March 2010.

  46. 46.

    To name a case, despite strong resistance by some legislators in Commission I, the procurement proposal of France made-Armoured Vanguard Vehicles (VAB) was eventually approved by the parliament in 2006. At a focus group discussion with several members of the Commission on 28 June 2007, a legislator from one of the major political parties acknowledged that he had to approve the proposal after receiving a memo from the party’s chairman.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Nanyang Technological University, Nanyang, Singapore

    Leonard C. Sebastian &  Iisgindarsah

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  1. Leonard C. Sebastian
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  2. Iisgindarsah
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Correspondence to Leonard C. Sebastian .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Rempartstraße 15, Freiburg, 79085, Germany

    Jürgen Rüland

  2. Department of Political Science, University of Freiburg, Rempartstraße 15, Freiburg, 79085, Germany

    Maria-Gabriela Manea

  3. Armed Forces (DCAF), Centre for the Democratic Control of, Rue de Chantepoulet 11, Geneva, 1211, Switzerland

    Hans Born

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Sebastian, L.C., Iisgindarsah (2013). Taking Stock of Military Reform in Indonesia. In: Rüland, J., Manea, MG., Born, H. (eds) The Politics of Military Reform. Global Power Shift. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29624-6_2

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