A Ring Based Onion Circuit for Hidden Services

  • Hakem Beitollahi
  • Geert Deconinck
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7161)


The capability that a server can hide its location while offering various kinds of services to its clients is called hidden services or location-hiding. Almost previous low-latency anonymous communication systems such as Tor, MorphMix, etc. that can be used to implement hidden services are vulnerable against end-to-end traffic analysis attack. In this paper, we introduce a novel architecture for implementing hidden services which is robust against end-to-end traffic analysis attack. Moreover, our scheme is more robust against various traffic analysis attacks than previous low-latency anonymous communication architectures.


Overlay Network Malicious Node Clockwise Direction Response Packet Rendezvous Point 
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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Hakem Beitollahi
    • 1
  • Geert Deconinck
    • 1
  1. 1.Electrical Engineering DepartmentKatholieke Universiteit LeuvenLeuvenBelgium

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