On the Democratic Legitimation of International Judicial Lawmaking

  • Armin von Bogdandy
  • Ingo Venzke
Part of the Beiträge zum ausländischen öffentlichen Recht und Völkerrecht book series (BEITRÄGE, volume 236)


While the introductory contribution addressed the questions and definitions of our research into judicial lawmaking, this concluding chapter discusses strategies regarding the justification of international judicial lawmaking that our introduction sought to capture and that the volume set out to present. How can one square such lawmaking with the principle of democracy? A first response could be to negate the phenomenon. If there were no such thing as judicial lawmaking, there would evidently be no need for its justification. This response, though unconvincing, merits attention all the same because, according to the traditional and still widespread view of international dispute settlement, international decisions flow from the consent of the state parties to the dispute, both from the consensual basis of the applicable law and from consent-based jurisdiction.


International Criminal Court Dispute Settlement International Court Appellate Body Report Judicial Election 
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Copyright information

© Max-Planck-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaften e.V. 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Armin von Bogdandy
    • 1
  • Ingo Venzke
    • 2
  1. 1.Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (MPIL)HeidelbergGermany
  2. 2.University of AmsterdamAmsterdamNetherlands

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