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Choice and Uncertainty in Games

  • Rohit Parikh
  • Çağıl Taşdemir
  • Andreas Witzel
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7230)

Abstract

We consider an agent choosing between two acts A, B, whose outcomes are uncertain and depend on factors which the agent does not fully know. But for each pair of possible outcomes the agent does know how she would choose. Does the agent then have a way of choosing between the acts which will work at least some of the time?

Keywords

Subjective Probability Moderate Player Ordinal Rank Rational Player Weak Dominance 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rohit Parikh
    • 1
    • 2
  • Çağıl Taşdemir
    • 2
  • Andreas Witzel
    • 3
  1. 1.Brooklyn College of the City University of New YorkUSA
  2. 2.Graduate Center of the City University of New YorkUSA
  3. 3.Courant InstituteNew York UniversityUSA

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