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Choice and Uncertainty in Games

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Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNPSE,volume 7230)

Abstract

We consider an agent choosing between two acts A, B, whose outcomes are uncertain and depend on factors which the agent does not fully know. But for each pair of possible outcomes the agent does know how she would choose. Does the agent then have a way of choosing between the acts which will work at least some of the time?

Keywords

  • Subjective Probability
  • Moderate Player
  • Ordinal Rank
  • Rational Player
  • Weak Dominance

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Parikh, R., Taşdemir, Ç., Witzel, A. (2012). Choice and Uncertainty in Games. In: Constable, R.L., Silva, A. (eds) Logic and Program Semantics. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7230. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29485-3_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29485-3_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29484-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29485-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)