Research on Coordination in Supply Chain for Perishable Goods Based on Quality Risk
The paper examines the problem of quality control under supply chain coordination for perishable goods based on quality risk. Considering the asymmetric information, the models of principal-agent are formulated based on the share level of the quality risk between supplier and buyer when one of quality evaluation level and quality prevention level is unobservable and when both of them are unobservable. Make the decision of the penalty for defective unites identified during inspection and the external failure’s share level between buyer and supplier to optimize the profit of the whole supply chain when there is moral-hazard and the partner is purchasing individual optimization.
Keywordsquality risk perishable goods quality prevention quality evaluation coordination quality control
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