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Avoiding Delegation Subterfuge Using Linked Local Permission Names

  • Simon N. Foley
  • Samane Abdi
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7140)

Abstract

Trust Management systems are typically explicit in their assumption that principals are uniquely identifiable. However, the literature has not been as prescriptive concerning the uniqueness of the permissions delegated by principals. Delegation subterfuge may arise when there is ambiguity concerning the uniqueness and interpretation of a permission. As a consequence, delegation chains that are used by principals to prove authorization may not actually reflect the original intention of all of the participants in the chain. This paper describes an extension to SPKI/SDSI that uses the notion of linked local permissions to eliminate ambiguity concerning the interpretation of a permission and thereby avoid subterfuge attacks.

Keywords

Delegation Statement Trust Management Compliance Check Trust Management System Local Permission 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Simon N. Foley
    • 1
  • Samane Abdi
    • 1
  1. 1.Cork Constraint Computation Centre, Department of Computer ScienceUniversity College CorkIreland

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