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Is Cryptyc Able to Detect Insider Attacks?

  • Behnam Sattarzadeh
  • Mehran S. Fallah
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7140)

Abstract

The use of type checking for analyzing security protocols has been recognized for several years. A state-of-the-art type checker based on such an idea is Cryptyc. It has been proven that if an authentication protocol is well-typed in Cryptyc, it provides authenticity in any environment containing external adversaries. The type system implemented by Cryptyc, however, is such that one may hope to be able to detect insider attacks as well. The lack of any report of a well-typed protocol being vulnerable to insider attacks has strengthened such a conjecture. This has been an open question from the last version of Cryptyc. In this paper, we show that the answer to this question is “No”. More precisely, we first introduce a public-key authentication protocol which is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack mounted by a legitimate principal. Then, it is shown that this protocol is typable in Cryptyc. We also make slight changes in Cryptyc so that it can trap the protocols being vulnerable to this kind of insider attacks. The new type system is sound.

Keywords

Authentication protocols insider attacks language-based security type-based analysis 

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Behnam Sattarzadeh
    • 1
  • Mehran S. Fallah
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer Engineering and Information TechnologyAmirkabir University of Technology (Tehran Polytechnic)TehranIran
  2. 2.School of MathematicsInstitute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM)TehranIran

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