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On Pricing Strategies of Boundedly Rational Telecommunication Operators

  • Bogumil Kaminski
  • Maciej Latek
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7190)

Abstract

We analyze a multiagent model of a pre-paid telecommunication market and illustrate how the topology of the call graph among customers influences long-run market prices. Verifying the robustness of our results by controlling for telecommunication operators’ levels of rationality and price elasticity of customer demand for airtime, we show that operators’ rationality levels influence the market’s rate of convergence to long-run price levels while the price elasticity of demand significantly influences the relation between on- and off-network prices. In particular, increasing the price elasticity of demand leads to more price differentiation among customers regardless of call graph topology.

Keywords

Price Elasticity Price Strategy Price Discrimination Small World Network Call Graph 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Bogumil Kaminski
    • 1
  • Maciej Latek
    • 2
  1. 1.Decision Support and Analysis DivisionWarsaw School of EconomicsWarsawPoland
  2. 2.Department of Computational Social ScienceGeorge Mason UniversityVirginiaU.S.A.

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