Abstract
In the experiment we investigate how an agent’s participation in the budgetary process influences his willingness to truthful communication of private information, if there are financial incentives to misrepresentation. The paper focuses on the trade-off between the agent’s preferences for wealth and honesty. The objective is to find and examine the relation between social preferences and honesty in managerial reporting.
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Mietek, A., Leopold-Wildburger, U. (2012). Honesty in Budgetary Reporting - an Experimental Study. In: Klatte, D., Lüthi, HJ., Schmedders, K. (eds) Operations Research Proceedings 2011. Operations Research Proceedings. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_33
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29210-1_33
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