From Non-adaptive to Adaptive Pseudorandom Functions

  • Itay Berman
  • Iftach Haitner
Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 7194)

Abstract

Unlike the standard notion of pseudorandom functions (PRF), a non-adaptive PRF is only required to be indistinguishable from random in the eyes of a non-adaptive distinguisher (i.e., one that prepares its oracle calls in advance). A recent line of research has studied the possibility of a direct construction of adaptive PRFs from non-adaptive ones, where direct means that the constructed adaptive PRF uses only few (ideally, constant number of) calls to the underlying non-adaptive PRF. Unfortunately, this study has only yielded negative results, showing that “natural” such constructions are unlikely to exist (e.g., Myers [EUROCRYPT ’04], Pietrzak [CRYPTO ’05, EUROCRYPT ’06])..

We give an affirmative answer to the above question, presenting a direct construction of adaptive PRFs from non-adaptive ones. Our construction is extremely simple, a composition of the non-adaptive PRF with an appropriate pairwise independent hash function.

Keywords

Function Family Pseudorandom Generator Direct Construction Pseudorandom Function Oracle Access 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Itay Berman
    • 1
  • Iftach Haitner
    • 1
  1. 1.School of Computer ScienceTel Aviv UniversityIsrael

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