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Trust and Normative Control in Multi-agent Systems: An Empirical Study

  • Joana Urbano
  • Henrique Lopes Cardoso
  • Ana Paula Rocha
  • Eugénio Oliveira
Part of the Advances in Intelligent and Soft Computing book series (AINSC, volume 156)

Abstract

Despite relevant insights from socio-economics, little research in multiagent systems has addressed the interconnections between trust and normative notions such as contracts and sanctions. Focusing our attention on scenarios of betrayal, in this paper we combine the use of trust and sanctions in a negotiation process. We describe a scenario of dyadic relationships between truster agents, which make use of trust and/or sanctions, and trustees characterized by their ability and integrity, which may influence their attitude toward betrayal. Both agent behavior models are inspired in socio-economics literature. Through simulation, we show the virtues and shortcomings of exploiting trust, sanctions and a combination of both.

Keywords

Multiagent System Governance Mechanism Dyadic Relationship Legalistic Remedy Relevant Insight 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joana Urbano
    • 1
  • Henrique Lopes Cardoso
    • 1
  • Ana Paula Rocha
    • 1
  • Eugénio Oliveira
    • 1
  1. 1.LIACC / DEI, Faculdade de EngenhariaUniversidade do PortoPortoPortugal

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