Trust and Normative Control in Multi-agent Systems: An Empirical Study
Despite relevant insights from socio-economics, little research in multiagent systems has addressed the interconnections between trust and normative notions such as contracts and sanctions. Focusing our attention on scenarios of betrayal, in this paper we combine the use of trust and sanctions in a negotiation process. We describe a scenario of dyadic relationships between truster agents, which make use of trust and/or sanctions, and trustees characterized by their ability and integrity, which may influence their attitude toward betrayal. Both agent behavior models are inspired in socio-economics literature. Through simulation, we show the virtues and shortcomings of exploiting trust, sanctions and a combination of both.
KeywordsMultiagent System Governance Mechanism Dyadic Relationship Legalistic Remedy Relevant Insight
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 1.Bachmann, R.: Trust, power and control in trans-organizational relations. Organization Studies 22(2), 341–369 (2001)Google Scholar
- 2.Das, T.K., Teng, B.: Between trust and control: Developing confidence in partner cooperation in alliances. Academy of Management Review 23(3), 491–512 (1998)Google Scholar
- 3.Elangovan, A.R., Shapiro, D.L.: Betrayal of trust in organizations. The Academy of Management Review 23(3), 547–566 (1998)Google Scholar
- 5.Luhmann, N.: Trust and Power. John Wiley & Sons, New York (1979)Google Scholar
- 6.Mayer, R.C., Davis, J.H., Schoorman, F.D.: An integrative model of organizational trust. The Academy of Management Review 20(3), 709–734 (1995)Google Scholar
- 7.Sako, M.: Does trust improve business performance? In: Lane, C., Bachmann, R. (eds.) Trust within and between Organizations: Conceptual Issues and Empirical Applications, Oxford University Press (1998)Google Scholar
- 10.Urbano, M.J., Rocha, A.P., Oliveira, E.: A Dynamic Agents’ Behavior Model for Computational Trust. In: Antunes, L., Pinto, H.S. (eds.) EPIA 2011. LNCS, vol. 7026, pp. 536–550. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)Google Scholar