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Concurrent Games with Ordered Objectives

Concurrent Games with Ordered Objectives

  • Patricia Bouyer17,
  • Romain Brenguier17,
  • Nicolas Markey17 &
  • …
  • Michael Ummels17 
  • Conference paper
  • 885 Accesses

  • 15 Citations

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNTCS,volume 7213)

Abstract

We consider concurrent games played on graphs, in which each player has several qualitative (e.g. reachability or Büchi) objectives, and a preorder on these objectives (for instance the counting order, where the aim is to maximise the number of objectives that are fulfilled).

We study two fundamental problems in that setting: (1) the value problem, which aims at deciding the existence of a strategy that ensures a given payoff; (2) the Nash equilibrium problem, where we want to decide the existence of a Nash equilibrium (possibly with a condition on the payoffs). We characterise the exact complexities of these problems for several relevant preorders, and several kinds of objectives.

Keywords

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Winning Strategy
  • Nash Equilibrium Problem
  • Boolean Circuit
  • Winning Region

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. LSV, CNRS & ENS Cachan, France

    Patricia Bouyer, Romain Brenguier, Nicolas Markey & Michael Ummels

Authors
  1. Patricia Bouyer
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  2. Romain Brenguier
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  3. Nicolas Markey
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  4. Michael Ummels
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. IT University of Copenhagen, Rued Langgaards Vej 7, 2300, Copenhagen, Denmark

    Lars Birkedal

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Bouyer, P., Brenguier, R., Markey, N., Ummels, M. (2012). Concurrent Games with Ordered Objectives. In: Birkedal, L. (eds) Foundations of Software Science and Computational Structures. FoSSaCS 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7213. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28729-9_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28729-9_20

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